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ABSTRACT
Commentators, public officials, and scholars have sounded
alarms over the smartphone patent wars—hundreds of cases
asserting infringement of patents by makers of smartphones and
tablet computers—often suggesting broad, categorical “fixes” to
problems this litigation reveals. In general, these
recommendations sweep too broadly, throwing out good claims
as well as bad and needed remedies as well as questionable
ones. However, calls for attention along two margins promise
improvements. One factor, the identity of the enterprise
asserting patent rights, already is being used by courts in
considering appropriate patent infringement remedies, but its
use needs to be refined. The other factor, patent quality—
especially in software patents, where the existence of parallel
schemes of intellectual property protection exacerbates quality
problems—is even more critical to the way the system operates.
Addressing the patent quality issue (which is distinct from
patent clarity or patent notice) can do more than other reforms
to reduce costs without reducing innovation incentives.
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INTRODUCTION
In August 2012, a jury in San Diego, California, returned a
verdict for damages in the amount of over $1 billion in favor of
Apple Inc. after finding that Samsung had infringed several
patents protecting design and operating features of Apple’s
iPhones and iPads.1 The verdict, arrived at in only twenty-one
hours, despite having to address 700 questions and review trial
testimony that stretched over four weeks, valued the infringed
patents at approximately forty-eight dollars per device.2 That
1. See, e.g., Josh Lowensohn, Jury Awards Apple More than $1 Billion,
Finds Samsung Infringed, CNET (Aug. 24, 2012, 3:53 PM),
http://www.cnet.com/news/jury-awards-apple-more-than-1b-finds-samsung-in
fringed/.
2. See, e.g., Billy Gallagher, Apple Awarded $1.049 Billion in Damages
as Jury Finds Samsung Infringed on Design and Software Patents,
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value shocked some observers, as the patent claims at issue
covered minor aspects of design and operation.3 Given the
magnitude of both patented components and methods of
operation potentially at issue in every smartphone or similar
mobile communication device—commonly estimated at 200,000
to 250,0004—that valuation would plausibly suggest that even
without any investment in parts, assembly, marketing, or other
commercial costs, these items should each retail somewhere in
the $2 million range, which is between 3,000 and 40,000 times
the actual prices of these devices.5
With stories like this (and the McDonald’s coffee case) in
mind, the rest of the world looks at the American trial system
with views that range between amusement and apoplexy.6
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 24, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/08/24/apple-wins-pa
tent-ruling-as-jury-finds-samsung-infringes/; Brian J. Love, Apple-Samsung
Patent Fight: Fuzzy Math, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/30/opinion/la-oe-love-apple-patent-damag
es-20120830; Nick Wingfield, Jury Awards $1 Billion to Apple in Samsung
Patent Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25
/technology/jury-reaches-decision-in-apple-samsung-patent-trial.html?_r=2&.
3. See, e.g., Haydn Shaughnessy, Why the Apple vs Samsung Verdict Is a
Big Mistake, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2012, 7:27 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/haydnshaughnessy/2012/08/26/why-the-apple-vs
-samsung-verdict-is-a-big-mistake/.
4. See, e.g., L. Gordon Crovitz, Google, Motorola and the Patent Wars,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2011, at A11, available at http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424053111903639404576518493092643006.html; Steve Lohr, Apple-
Samsung Case Shows Smartphone as Legal Magnet, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/technology/apple-samsung-case-sh
ows-smartphone-as-lawsuit-magnet.html; Mike Masnick, There Are 250,000
Active Patents That Impact Smartphones; Representing One in Six Active
Patents Today, TECHDIRT (Oct. 18, 2012, 8:28 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/blog/innovation/articles/20121017/10480520734/ther
e-are-250000-active-patents-that-impact-smartphones-representing-one-six-ac
tive-patents-today.shtml.
5. See supra notes 2, 4.
6. See, e.g., Liebeck v. McDonald’s Rests., P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419,
1995 WL 360309 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994); Aric Press et al., Are Lawyers
Burning America?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 1995, at 32; Alex Kozinski, The Case
of Punitive Damages v. Democracy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1995, at A18
(discussing a seventy-nine-year-old woman, Stella Liebeck, who famously
opened a cup of McDonald’s coffee that she had propped between her legs,
spilling the coffee and suffering third-degree burns; she sued, claiming that
McDonald’s served its coffee twenty to thirty degrees hotter than the norm for
restaurant coffee, and received a jury verdict for $2.9 million, including $2.7
million in punitive damages, which was widely ridiculed and satirized as a $3
million dollar payment for McDonald’s failure to warn customers that hot
coffee can be hot).
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Anything as complex and difficult to evaluate as the role that
specific features play in product design and composition or the
degree to which certain features mimic others is surely beyond
the ken of the men and women who comprise American juries.7
There certainly is much to be concerned about in turning these
decisions over to lay juries, yet given the American
Constitution’s express protection for historic rights to jury trial,
this peculiar feature of our legal system is not likely to change.8
Juries do not have the last word—the district court judge in
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. denied Apple’s
petition to increase damages against Samsung and granted
Samsung’s petition to reduce damages, which first were cut in
half by the judge, then vacated for a new calculation of what
should be owed9 —but they do play an important role.10
Despite legitimate concerns over the role of juries, this
peculiar American process is not the only feature driving
results like those in the Apple-Samsung case. Equally
important is the design of the American intellectual property
system, which has come under fire for producing results like
the Apple-Samsung verdict.11 After all, the jury verdict was
possible only because certain aspects of the American patent
law system (both the substantive law and the procedures for
implementing it) provided avenues for placing particular
questions before the jury and for potentially answering the
questions as the jury did.12 Notably, the law gave scope to find
7. See generally Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided
That One Coffee Spill Is Worth $2.9 Million, WALL ST. J. EUR., Sept. 2, 1994,
at 1, 6 (discussing how jurors handled the McDonald’s coffee case, which
involved a product significantly less complex than smartphones).
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
9. See, e.g., Brian X. Chen, Jury to Decide How Much More Samsung
Must Pay Apple in Patent Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2013, at B3; Ian Sherr,
U.S. Judge Reduces Apple’s Patent Award in Samsung Case, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
1, 2013, 5:57 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732347830
4578334540541100744.html.
10. See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 6.
11. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE:
HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 1–28
(Princeton Univ. Press ed., 2008) (introducing their general criticism of the
current patent system); Steven Levy, The Patent Problem, WIRED (Nov. 13,
2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/11/ff-steven-levy-the-pat
ent-problem/all/.
12. See, e.g., Reza Mirzaie, Weighing the Role of Juries in Patent Cases, 36
L.A. LAW. 13 (2013), available at http://www.lacba.org/Files/LAL/Vol36No5
/3060.pdf.
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that the patents covering relatively modest advances in
technology and relatively obvious design features were validly
granted the powerful protection of patent rights and also
provided vehicles for drawing conclusions about the value of
those patents—and the best ways to protect the associated
patent rights—that led to the much-discussed result.13
More troubling than the outcome in a single case, the
Apple-Samsung trial is only one outcropping in the landscape
of legal proceedings over patents used today in the production
and operation of smartphones and tablet computers. Hundreds
of cases involving the major producers of these mobile
communications and computing devices have been filed in the
courts and with the U.S. International Trade Commission
(ITC), a century-old administrative agency that shares
jurisdiction over trade-related patent contests with U.S. district
courts.14 In the last few years, Samsung and Apple alone have
filed scores of claims against one another in several
jurisdictions in the United States, before the ITC, and in courts
in at least ten countries.15 Add to that the cases involving HTC,
Kodak, Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia, and Research in Motion
(RIM), maker of the BlackBerry, and you have a substantial
proportion of recent patent cases.16
13. See, e.g., infra notes 102–06 and accompanying text. U.S. Supreme
Court decisions over the last few years have pushed the law in a different
direction. See generally Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134. S. Ct.
2347, 2347 (2014) (“We hold that the claims at issue are drawn to the abstract
idea of intermediated settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer
implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.”); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
14. See, e.g., U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, FACTS AND TRENDS REGARDING
USITC SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS (2013), available at http://www.usitc.gov
/press_room/documents/featured_news/sec337factsupdate.pdf.
15. See, e.g., Mariko Yasu & Naoko Fujimura, Apple Loses Patent Lawsuit
Against Samsung in Japan, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 31, 2012, 12:16 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-31/apple-loses-japan-patent-lawsuit
-against-samsung-over-devices.html; see also Lohr, supra note 4.
16. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC,
and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (2012); Crovitz, supra note
4; Ming-Jeong Lee & Jonathan Cheng, Samsung Patent-Licensing Deal Is
Reached with Google, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2014, at B6, available at
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230327770457934579138
8237228; Lohr, supra note 4 (stating that although some of the major litigants
have begun negotiating settlements, a significant body of litigation remains);
Brid-Aine Parnell, Nokia and HTC Throw Down Swords, Sign Patent War
Peace Treaty, REGISTER (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014
/02/11/nokia_htc_patent_agreement.
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Commentators looking at these cases have offered
disparate views on whether these cases suggest problems with
the patent system and, if so, what needs to be done.17
Recommendations have included making it more difficult to
secure injunctions against patent infringement, limiting relief
available to entities that do not practice the patents at issue in
litigation, raising the threshold for patent awards, and
eliminating patent protection for software.18
This Article examines what the smartphone wars tell us
about stresses within American patent law (and more broadly
American intellectual property (IP) law) and explores possible
changes that might help improve the law. By and large, the
patent system works, and most suggestions for major change
are not supported by strong data and analysis, but calls for
attention along two margins promise needed improvements.19
One factor, the identity of the enterprise asserting patent
rights, already is being used by courts when considering
appropriate patent infringement remedies.20 The other factor,
patent quality (especially in software patents), is even more
critical to the way the system operates.21 The patent quality
issue is not the same as the question of patent clarity or patent
notice stressed by other scholars.22 Addressing problems of
17. See, e.g., Chien & Lemley, supra note 16, at 39–43 (discussing how
eBay resulted in patentees going to the ITC to obtain “an injunction no longer
available in the federal district courts”); Levy, supra note 11.
18. See JASON ALBERT, MICROSOFT CORP., COMMENTS OF MICROSOFT
CORPORATION ON THE IMPACT OF PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITIES ON
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr
/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew-0042.pdf; Tim Wu, Weapons of
Business Destruction: How a Tiny Little “Patent Troll” Got BlackBerry in a
Headlock, SLATE (Feb. 6, 2006, 3:04 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news
_and_politics/jurisprudence/2006/02/weapons_of_business_destruction.single.h
tml.
19. E.g., William G. Barber, The U.S. Patent System Works, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 10, 2012, 5:43 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/10/10
/%20does-the-law-support-inventors-or-investors/the-us-patent-system-works.
20. See generally James W. Soong, Patent Damage Strategies and the
Enterprise License: Constructive Notice, Actual Notice, No Notice, 4 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV., no. 1, 2005, at 1–2, available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1122&context=dltr
(expressing how patentees of enterprise software patents can still assert
alternative notice theories when these patentees want to preserve legal
remedies).
21. See infra Parts III, IV.
22. Compare, e.g., the discussion of patent quality issues, infra Parts II,
IV, with BESSEN&MEURER, supra note 11, at 120–32; see also John R. Allison
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weak patents can do more than other reforms to reduce costs
without reducing innovation incentives.23
I. PROMOTING AND PROTECTING INNOVATION
At the outset, it is important to keep in mind the case in
favor of patents. So much has been written in the past half-
century questioning the case for a patent system (or at least
one that looks like current patent law) that it is worth recalling
the underlying sense of patent law.24 Fritz Machlup recounted
four distinct, but overlapping, explanations supporting why
patents should grant exclusive rights to inventors:
The “natural-law” thesis assumes that man has a natural property
right in his own ideas . . . . Property is, in essence, exclusive. Hence,
enforcement of exclusivity in the use of a patented invention is the
only appropriate way for society to recognize this property right.
The “reward-by-monopoly” thesis assumes that justice requires that
a man receive reward for his services in proportion to their
usefulness to society . . . [with inventive activity best secured by
temporary] exclusive patent rights in their inventions.
The “monopoly-profit-incentive” thesis assumes that . . . inventions
and/or their exploitation will not be obtained in sufficient measure if
inventors and capitalists can hope only for [competitive levels of
profit from inventive activity] . . . . The simplest, cheapest, and most
effective way for society to hold out [incentives for enough profit to
induce the appropriate amount of inventive activity] is to grant
temporary monopolies in the form of exclusive patent rights in
inventions.
The “exchange-of-secrets” thesis presumes a bargain between
inventor and society, the former surrendering the possession of
secret knowledge in exchange for the protection of a temporary
exclusivity in its industrial use.25
& Ronald J. Mann, The Disputed Quality of Software Patents, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 297, 334 (2007).
23. E.g., Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution,
in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 111, 111–15 (Adam B. Jaffe et al.
eds., 8th ed. 2008).
24. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 11, at 120–32; MICHELE
BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUALMONOPOLY 15–67, 149–
83 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 2008). While debate over the justification for
and proper scope of a patent system has gone on for more than two centuries,
the intellectual assault on patents accelerated again in the past fifty years
after a period of relative quiet. See, e.g., Peter J. Toren, The Assault on
Patents, HILL (Aug. 13, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog
/judicial/214943-the-assault-on-patents.
25. FRITZ MACHLUP, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS, 85TH CONG., STUDY ON AN ECONOMIC REVIEW
OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 21 (1958). Machlup distinguished the second thesis,
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Although the natural law argument doubtless was a source
of early support for patents and continues to play a role in
shaping intellectual property rights in Europe,26 the primary
support for patent has centered on the consequentialist
arguments, essentially the costs and benefits of using exclusive
rights as a spur to increased innovation.27 The U.S.
Constitution, for example, ties intellectual property rights
directly to consequential social benefit in declaring that the
national government will have the power “To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”28
Likewise, the effectiveness of intellectual property law,
including patent law, at securing public benefits, rather than
securing private benefits while generating public costs, has
been a main focus of debate in the law.29 The debate largely has
been framed in static cost terms, comparing the value of
as provision of a just reward for invention, from the third, as provision of a
sufficient reward, to call forth the optimal (or more nearly optimal) amount of
invention. See id.
26. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression:
Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102
YALE L.J. 1533, 1540–44 (1993) (discussing the progression of the natural law
approach to intellectual property); see also Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the
Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J.
1255, 1256–59 (2001) (challenging the “prevailing view that the ideas
of . . . natural rights . . . did not influence the early development of patent
law”).
27. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1977); Robert P. Merges & Richard R.
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839,
868–78 (1990). Machlup distinguished “invention” from “innovation,” which he
defined as a novel function that could, but need not, embody the practical
application of an invention. See MACHLUP, supra note 25, at 56, 78. I do not
similarly differentiate between the two terms, given the requirement that
patentable inventions be novel and practical and the fact that virtually all
contests respecting patents involve those that are put into practical use.
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
29. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 11, at 120–32; BOLDRIN &
LEVINE, supra note 24, at 15–67, 149–83; LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE:
HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (Penguin Press 2004); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy
Case for Copyright: A Study in Copyright of Books, Photocopies, and Computer
Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 326–30 (1970); F. Scott Kieff, Coordination,
Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to
Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 397
(2006) (offering a more positive assessment of the cost-benefit calculation).
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increased innovation induced by the award of property rights in
patented innovations to the cost of decreased use due to
monopoly pricing of patented innovations.30 Although,
increasingly, scholars have recognized more important,
dynamic aspects of patent law,31 the tools of standard
microeconomic analysis—and the allure of analysis built on
anecdote—continue to tilt discourse on the patent system
toward evaluation in terms of static effects.32
Machlup ultimately was agnostic about the economic
analysis of patent rights’ costs and benefits, but ended his
review with a version of Pascal’s wager, saying that in the
absence of conclusive evidence it would be irresponsible to
eliminate a system that has been in place for nations that have
made great strides in innovation.33 Certainly, there is much
that is unknown, and probably unknowable, about the degree
to which patent law promotes investment in innovation (as
opposed to merely shifting investment among different
potential sources of innovation), about the benefits of patent
law (both the stock of current law and its role in improving the
flow of innovative ideas) in comparison to costs in restricting
patent use, and about the precise calibration of various aspects
of patent law.34
30. E.g., ARNOLD PLANT, THE ECONOMIC THEORY CONCERNING PATENTS
FOR INVENTIONS (1934), reprinted in ARNOLD PLANT, SELECTED ECONOMIC
ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 35 (Routledge & Keegan Paul eds., 1974).
31. See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION:
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THEWORLD OF IDEAS 49–75 (Harvard Univ. Press 2013).
32. E.g., WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, COWLES FOUND. FOR RESEARCH IN
ECON., THE OPTIMAL LIFE OF A PATENT (1967), available at
http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d02a/d0241.pdf; see also Paul Klemperer, How
Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113, 120–
24 (1990) (explaining how to use microeconomic tools of evaluation to
determine patent length); Frederic M. Scherer, Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal
Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422, 424–26
(1972) (discussing the evaluation of static effects).
33. See MACHLUP, supra note 25, at 80. By the same token, Machlup
would not have recommended instituting patent systems in nations that were
doing well without them. Id.
34. E.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of
Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 616–25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research
ed., 1962); FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH:
SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES 130–91 (MIT Press 1984); SUZANNE
SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 117–18 (MIT Press 2004).
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However, despite the questions, there is significant reason
to believe that the weight of analysis lies on the side of patent
law generally providing important impetus to valuable
innovation. Among other things, nations with laws that
strongly protect intellectual property rights exhibit higher
growth rates than broadly comparable nations with less IP-
protective laws; examination of the central features of patent
law suggests that, although they generate some static costs,
these features probably generate dynamic benefits that yield
social value in excess of their social costs.35 The definition of
patentable subject matter, the basic requirements for
patenting, and essential rules of claim construction, for
example, all fit comfortably within a design that is sensitive to
dynamic-versus-static cost tradeoffs.36 Patent systems also
avoid some of the problems associated with more centralized
approaches, such as innovation prizes, largely because they
elide the need to know in advance with some certainty the
value of particular innovations.37
Patents do interfere to some extent with follow-on
innovation, which becomes more expensive as the volume and
breadth of existing patents rises, and the scope of this
interference also increases as the significance and novelty of
the existing patents rise (characteristics that expand the
35. See, e.g., CASS & HYLTON, supra note 31, at 45–46, 50–56, 60–75. See
generally ZVI GRILICHES, R&D AND PRODUCTIVITY: THE ECONOMETRIC
EVIDENCE (Univ. of Chi. Press 1998); Charles I. Jones, Growth and Ideas, in
1B HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 1063 (Philippe Aghion & Steven N.
Durlauf eds., Elsevier 2005). Some scholars assert that R&D and productivity
have not increased commensurately with the increased strength of patent
protections, from which they conclude that patents do not contribute to
economic growth. See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case
Against Patents, (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2012-
035A, 2012), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-035.pdf.
These arguments, however, do not account for changes in the ability of firms
to evade patent strictures, nor do they consider the tendency of returns in all
markets, including markets in innovation, to move toward the competitive
equilibrium over time—phenomena that would limit both investment in R&D
and productivity gains from additional R&D, even if patent rights were
important inducements to investment in innovation. See id. In short, the
evidence marshaled in these works does not prove the conclusions. See id.
36. See, e.g., CASS&HYLTON, supra note 31, at 50–75.
37. E.g., id. at 69–70; see also SCOTCHMER, supra note 34, at 39–40;
Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 119–27
(2003) (explaining defects in patent prize systems, but endeavoring to create a
novel, retrospective alternative mechanism for setting prize levels).
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chances of activity infringing a patent and that decrease the
likelihood of finding good substitutes for the patented product
or method).38 In some settings, these effects may be especially
problematic.39 At the same time, the ability to profit from a
truly novel patent increases with these effects, raising the
inducement to invest in (at least certain types of) patenting
activity.40
Even looking beyond the debate over the general value of
patent systems, issues respecting the benefits and costs of some
specific aspects of patent law remain.41 Four of these are
identified in Part II, below, and key concerns that emerge from
this set are discussed further in Parts III and IV. As explained
in these Parts of the Article, there are legitimate bases for
concern about some patent litigation, but many expressed
concerns are exaggerated, and some of the most talked about
considerations on examination seem much less problematic
than frequently asserted. This Article narrows the focus of
concern ultimately to two features, particularly identifying
patent quality—especially respecting software—as the critical
place to make systemic improvement.
II. SMARTPHONE PATENT FIGHTS
While academics and other commentators have argued for
years about the proper scope of patent protection and best
design of patent law, these debates have gained a higher
38. See, e.g., James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation,
Patents, and Imitation, 40 RAND J. ECON. 611, 611 (2009); Merges & Nelson,
supra note 27, at 873–75.
39. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Antitrust for High-Tech and Low:
Regulation, Innovation, and Risk, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 169, 169 (2013);
Merges & Nelson, supra note 27. A similar effect is seen where returns above
the competitive level are available for other reasons. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass
& Keith N. Hylton, Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal
Standards and Microsoft, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 36–37 (1999); Nancy T.
Gallini, Patent Policy and Costly Imitation, 23 RAND J. ECON. 52 (1992); Jerry
R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential
Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 20 (1995); Klemperer, supra note 32. Further,
some research suggests that there is actually an increase in diffusion of
inventive knowledge from patenting that promotes additional innovative
activity. See, e.g., Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Inventors,
Firms, and the Market for Technology in the Late Nineteenth and Early
Twentieth Centuries, in LEARNING BY DOING IN MARKETS, FIRMS, AND
COUNTRIES 19, 23–24 (Naomi Lamoreaux et al. eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 1999).
41. See infra Part II.
12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 16:1
profile—and increased intensity—over the past few years
thanks to a series of high-profile patent contests involving
smartphones, tablet computers (tablets), and similar mobile
computing and communications devices.42 To understand why
these cases have drawn more commentary and more calls for
changes to the patent system, it is necessary to start with the
nature of the devices and the litigation.
A. MOBILEDEVICES: EVOLVING PRODUCTS, MARKETS, AND
TRADE
Mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets have
become everyday staples for a vast array of tasks: texting, e-
mailing, taking pictures and posting them to social networks,
scheduling, calculating, gaming, searching the Internet,
reading newspapers, navigating, and much more.43 The array
of different activities that used to be done on a dozen or more
devices dedicated to a single task (or closely related set of
tasks) have now largely migrated to integrated, portable
machines that can perform a wide variety of different tasks.44 A
multitude of products—including Apple’s iPhones and iPads,
phones and tablets made by HTC, Samsung, Motorola, and
many others designed to run on Google’s Android platforms,
RIM’s BlackBerry products, Microsoft-based phones and
devices from Microsoft itself or companies such as Nokia,
Samsung, and HTC—have become indispensable to business
executives, kids on the go, and stay-at-home parents.45 In fact,
they are relied on in economically advanced nations and,
increasingly, in many others, by nearly every type of person
and enterprise, at almost every level of affluence, and in an
astonishing array of settings.
The change in this field in a very short time has been
stunning. Technology that most of us now take for granted
would be completely foreign to someone transported twenty-
42. See BOLDRIN& LEVINE, supra note 24, at 15–67, 149–83.
43. See BENGI KORKMAZ ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., CYBER BOOM: WHY
TABLET DOMINATION HAS ONLY JUST BEGUN (2012), available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/search.aspx?q=Cyber+Boom%3A+Why+Tablet+Dom
ination+Has+Only+Just+Begun%2C.
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., Nancy Gibbs, Your Life Is Fully Mobile, TIME (Aug 16,
2012), http://techland.time.com/2012/08/16/your-life-is-fully-mobile/ (“It is hard
to think of any tool, any instrument, any object in history with which so many
developed so close a relationship so quickly as we have with our phones.”).
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five years forward from 1987 to 2012. Contrast today’s
incredibly flexible, feature-packed, complex little devices with
Motorola’s Dynatac 8000x, the classic mobile phone of the day,
famously shown in the 1987 film Wall Street as the device of
choice for those at the top of the financial world.46 The Dynatac
served simply as a phone that was not tethered by a cord,
weighed about two pounds, could store just thirty numbers, and
functioned for only one hour without recharging (a process that
took ten hours).47 The Dynatac cost nearly $4,000, ten to one
hundred times the price of phones today (and a far higher
multiple if the original cost is translated into equivalent
current-dollar terms).48
Very much unlike the original mobile phones, current
mobile devices combine an enormous amount of technological
know-how in a small physical space, aggregating enormous
numbers of advanced components and methods of operation
into products easily fitting in a pocket or purse.49 In addition,
the products are evolving rapidly in the look and feel of the
experiences they deliver and the attractiveness of their
presentation.50 High-quality video—from games to motion
pictures to home creations—now can be seen on small, highly
portable screens; sound for songs and speech is now routinely
expected with a fidelity that used to be reserved for home
sound systems; and every few months, the bar is raised on
what consumers expect while the prices of these products
continue to fall.51
46. Sara Breselor, Gordon Gecko’s Cell Phone, SLATE (Sept. 23, 2010,
12:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/2010/09/23/gordon_gekko
_s_cell_phone.html.
47. Peter Ha, All-Time 100 Gadgets, Communication: Motorola DynaTAC
8000x, TIME (Oct. 25, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages
/article/0,28804,2023689_2023708_2023656,00.html.
48. See, e.g., Ross Cantanzariti, The Mobile Phone: A History in Pictures,
TECHHIVE (Sept. 29, 2009, 3:10 PM), http://www.techhive.com/article
/172837/the_mobile_phone_a_history_in_pictures.html; Ha, supra note 47. The
cost of the Dynatac 8000x in 2012 dollars would be between $8000 and $9000.
Breselor, supra note 46.
49. See Gibbs, supra note 45 (“A typical smartphone has more computing
power than Apollo 11 when it landed a man on the moon.”).
50. See The Rapid Evolution of Smartphones, PROTECTCELL BLOG (June
1, 2012), http://www.protectcell.com/Blog/June-2012/The-rapid-evolution-of-sm
art-phones.aspx.
51. See KORKMAZ ET AL., supra note 43; Charles Arthur, PC Boom Is Over
as Tablets and Smartphones Take Over, Says IDC, GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 2013,
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As smartphones and tablets have morphed into multi-
faceted instruments for performing all manner of desired
functions, this sector has developed into a booming business.
The mobile device sector shipped more than $200 billion worth
of products in 2011 (some sources put this figure considerably
higher), and the total is growing rapidly, amounting to roughly
$500 billion in 2012.52 In addition, mobile devices and their
inputs have become major components of international trade.53
Many devices combine technology developed in the United
States with components produced in different parts of the
world. Production and assembly are largely concentrated in
Asia: in China (for Apple), Korea (for Samsung), or Taiwan (for
HTC and Microsoft).54 Once assembled, the products are sold
around the globe, including as imports into the United States.55
Annual smartphone sales rose from nearly 500 million
units in 2011, to over 700 million units in 2012, to almost one
billion units in 2013, and should go well past the billion unit
3:08 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/aug/30/pc-boom-over-t
ablets-smartphones.
52. See, e.g., Sarah Perez, Smart Device Shipments Broke Records in Q3
2012, Reaching 303.6 Million Devices, Expected to Grow to 362 Million in
Holiday Quarter, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 10, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/12
/10/smart-device-shipments-broke-records-in-q3-2012-reaching-303-6-million
-devices-expected-to-grow-to-362-million-in-holiday-quarter/ (estimating over
$300 billion for the last two quarters of 2012 and also estimating smartphone-
tablet market growth to nearly $800 billion by 2016); Joe Schneider, Australia
Judge Calls Apple-Samsung Dispute Over 3G ‘Ridiculous,’ BLOOMBERG NEWS
(Jul. 23, 2012, 2:44 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-22/samsung
-and-apple-global-patent-fight-moves-to-australia-trial.html (estimating the
2011 handset market figure at $312 billion); Victoria Slind-Flor, Samsung,
Apple, Disney, Leadscope: Intellectual Property, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 24,
2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-24/samsung-apple
-disney-leadscope-intellectual-property.html (estimating $219 billion for
smartphone-tablet market in 2011). The smartphone segment alone accounted
for sales exceeding $338 billion in 2013. Joel Rosenblatt, Samsung Calls One
of Its Own at $2 Billion Apple Patent Trial, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 14, 2014,
11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-14/samsung-calls-one-of
-its-own-at-2-billion-apple-patent-trial.html.
53. See, e.g., Eric Mack, Are Any Smartphones Not Made in China?, CNET
(Mar. 7, 2012, 3:07 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/are-any-smartphones-not
-made-in-china/ (“For one thing, a smartphone is a complicated device with
dozens of components that come from all around the world . . . . Your phone is
truly a global citizen . . . .”).
54. Id.
55. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
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mark in 2014.56 In fact, sales of Android smartphones alone are
expected to exceed one billion units in 2014.57 Smartphone
sales worldwide accounted for roughly $340 billion in sales in
2013.58 While the United States led the charge to smartphones,
passing 100 million smartphone owners shortly after the
beginning of 2012, China’s smartphone base was expected to be
roughly half again as large as the United States by the end of
2012; India, the fastest-growing major market for these
devices, is predicted to be a close third within the next four
years.59 U.S. imports of these devices are reported within the
category of mobile communications devices, with the most
recently available import data running at roughly $40 billion
annually60 (a figure certainly well below the current number).
B. SMARTPHONE PATENTWARS: WHAT ANDWHY
With the array of formerly distinct technologies that are
joined in these products comes the potential for contests over
56. E.g., Mark Brownlow, Smartphone Statistics and Market Share,
EMAIL MARKETING REP. (Oct. 2012), http://www.email-marketing-reports
.com/wireless-mobile/smartphone-statistics.htm; Mark Hamblen, Smartphone
Sales Growing by 45% in 2012, IDC Says, COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 4, 2012,
2:15 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9234314/Smartphone_sales
_growing_by_45_in_2012_IDC_says (reporting an estimated 717 million
smartphones shipped to vendors during 2012); Felix Richter, Smartphone
Shipments to Top 1 Billion in 2014, STATISTA (Mar. 27, 2013),
http://www.statista.com/chart/1011/connected-device-shipment-forecast/
(providing figures for 2012 and 2013 sales, and forecasting sales of over 1.5
billion units in 2014).
57. Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Says Worldwide PC, Tablet and
Mobile Phone Combined Shipments to Reach 2.4 Billion Units in 2013 (Apr. 4,
2013), available at http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2408515 (projecting
2014 Android shipments at over 1 billion).
58. See, e.g., Rosenblatt, supra note 52.
59. See, e.g., Agence Fr. Press, China to Overtake US as Largest
Smartphone Market, India Fourth: IDC, NDTV GADGETS (Aug. 31, 2012),
http://gadgets.ndtv.com/mobiles/news/china-to-overtake-us-as-largest
-smartphone-market-india-fourth-idc-261341; China Passes 1 Billion Mobile
Subscribers, Passes 400 Million Mobile Web Users and Overtakes US as
World’s Top Smartphone Market, MOBIFORGE (May 3, 2012),
http://mobithinking.com/blog/china-top-mobile-market; Trevor Mogg, US
Smartphone Users Now Over 100 Million, Android Increases Market Share,
DIGITAL TRENDS (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/us-smart
phone-users-now-over-100-million-android-increases-market-share/.
60. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. International Trade
in Goods and Services, Exhibit 8: Imports of Goods by End-Use Category and
Commodity (June 2014), available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade
/Press-Release/2014pr/06/exh8.pdf.
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the ownership of rights to the innovative products and methods
of production they represent.61 Each mobile device contains at
least tens of thousands—probably hundreds of thousands,
though it is not clear that the common estimate of 200,000 to
250,000 is accurate62—of advanced components and methods of
operation that are each potentially subject to patent claims.63
Inevitably, this has given rise to a series of high-profile legal
actions, some of which have become headline news.64 Presently,
hundreds of cases are pending among the handful of leading
companies, some of which are embroiled in large numbers of
cases taking place simultaneously (or nearly so) in a dozen or
more countries around the globe.65 For example, in addition to
a very high profile court fight in Silicon Valley, California,
Apple and Samsung have been engaged in legal battles in
Australia, Japan, Korea, Germany, the United Kingdom,
France, Italy, and the Netherlands—as well as before the
ITC.66
Four aspects of the environment that shape the technology
and competition in the smartphone and tablet markets come
together to create special problems in the ensuing patent
cases.67 One of these aspects has been considerably noted in
this context.68 Another has been the focus of extensive debate
61. See infra notes 62–66 and accompanying text
62. The accepted figure is not necessarily wrong; the problem, instead, is
that it is based on a certain amount of guesswork, rarely explained in clear
terms. Whatever the right figure, it clearly is a very large one. See, e.g., RPX
Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 59 (Sept. 2, 2011).
63. See infra notes 114–22.
64. E.g., Susan Decker, Kodak Loses Patent Suit Against Apple, RIM on
Imaging Patent, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 20, 2012, 4:44 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-20/kodak-loses-case-against-apple
-rim-on-imaging-patent.html; Ashby Jones & Jessica E. Vascellaro, Apple v.
Samsung: The Patent Trial of the Century, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 24, 2012, 1:01
PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443295404577543
221814648592.
65. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
66. See Scott Martin, Consumers Likely to Feel Apple Defeat of Samsung,
USA TODAY (Aug. 27, 2012, 3:45 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech
/news/story/2012-08-25/apple-samsung-patent-trial-impact/57332198/1; Steven
J. Vaughan-Nichols, Apple’s Worldwide War on Samsung and Android,
ZDNET (Nov. 30, 2011, 9:09 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/open-source
/apples-worldwide-war-on-samsung-and-android/9945.
67. See infra notes 72–108 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 72–78 and accompanying text.
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in relation to a different set of cases.69 The two other aspects
are observed in passing, but less frequently addressed as core
problems in the current patent wars.70
First, the technology simply offers an extraordinary
number of opportunities for fights over who is infringing whose
legal rights. Designs are complicated, many different
components and methods of operation are joined together, and
the number of different patent claims potentially implicated in
the devices makes every device a potential infringement of
someone else’s patent rights.71 The creator of any of these
devices, hence, confronts what critics of the current system
have dubbed a “patent thicket”—and, unlike Br’er Rabbit’s
story, this thicket is not one the designers and producers see as
a safe haven.72
In most settings where companies have potentially
offsetting claims against one another, accommodations will be
worked out with cross-licensing arrangements rather than
spending the time, money, and energy to litigate the
underlying legal and factual issues.73 Where so very many
69. See infra notes 79–84 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 85–108 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 115–23 and accompanying text.
72. E.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 11, at 120–32; Carl Shapiro,
Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-
Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al.
eds., MIT Press 2001); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE
698, 698–701 (1998) (highlighting the problem in a biomedical context); Adam
Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing
Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165 (2011); James Bessen, Patent
Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies, (Research on
Innovation, Working Paper No. 0401, 2004), available at
http://www.researchoninnovation.org/thicket.pdf.
73. E.g., Shapiro, supra note 23. Even where parties initially see an
advantage in litigating patent claims, once the outlines of likely judicial
dispositions become clear, parties with competing claims are likely to settle
through cross-licensing or cross-licensing-plus deals. This helps explain the
recent rash of settlements for companies holding different patents on
technologies used in smartphones and related products. See, e.g., Simon
Johnson, Samsung to Pay Ericsson $650 Mln Plus Royalties to End Patent
Spat, REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2014, 7:48 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article
/2014/01/27/ericsson-samsung-idUSL5N0L10H620140127; Lee & Cheng, supra
note 16; Min-Jeong Lee & Don Clark, Samsung, Cisco Sign Cross-License Pact
for Tech Patents, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2014, 4:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB10001424052702304680904579365220297306100; Parnell, supra
note 16.
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firms might have patented technology embedded in the
product, however, and where the value of different collections
of property rights can be quite disparate, such accommodations
cannot always be arranged. The costs of identifying the
potential patent claims and rights owners, the validity of the
claims, the likelihood that a claim is infringed and of
negotiating with the various owners of potentially infringed
claims in these settings often could exceed the value of the
product itself.74 While cross-licensing agreements covering
broad classes of innovations among likely holders and users of
patented technologies are the general answer to the problems
associated with these administrative costs, this approach will
not necessarily be availing if all the patented methods and
components from all the potential claimants are not included.75
The potential for problems in negotiating practical
accommodations is exacerbated when one party enjoys a
particular, significant market advantage because of a given
feature arguably protected by patent rights or when one of the
parties is neither a holder of patent rights nor producer of the
products.76 Recognition of this point has led to a growing
concern with the role of non-practicing entities (NPEs),
expressed by, among others, Justices Kennedy, Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.77 This
concern is discussed in Part III.
A second problem in these cases is that the rapid evolution
of the products, with new features constantly being added and
old features updated, makes it both more likely that there will
be potential new infringement claims and more likely that old
infringement claims may be outdated by the time the litigation
is concluded or shortly afterward.78 Even relatively slow
74. While many commentators looking at this sector have emphasized the
problems facing innovators who confront large numbers of potential patent
claims, it also is worth noting that past innovators also faced problems in this
setting, as the administrative costs of enforcement also may be large relative
to the gains. See, e.g., Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the
Patent System, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 289, 289–97 (2012).
75. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION, ch. 3 (2007).
76. See infra Part III; see also infra note 77.
77. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395–96
(2006) (Kennedy, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, J.J., concurring).
78. See infra Part III.
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changes in this sector occur at a fairly rapid rate by ordinary
industry standards.79 Apple, a company well-known for taking
a longer time for its new product releases, still has been
updating and altering its iPhone series on an annual basis,
while many other mobile device manufacturers have released
new models on a much faster pace, at times coming out with
new products every few months.80
The very rapidity of change in the mobile device sector is in
one sense a strong inducement to file claims, especially if the
relief available encompasses the exclusion of infringing
products from sale in a key market such as the United States.81
Because the product cycles are relatively short, the costs
associated with being excluded from the market for even a
fairly short time are relatively high.82 Demand for a given
product is quite time-limited, and market leadership can
change quickly, as firms like Nokia, Motorola, and RIM, among
others, have discovered.83 For the same reason, the costs from
having to compete against an infringing product for even a
fairly short time also can be high. From both sides of an
infringement claim, then, there is a special sensitivity to both
the impact of an injunction or exclusion order and the effect of
its timing.
Third, at least some parts of the mobile device sector
(particularly at the platform level), exhibit a winner-take-most
quality.84 Rather than maintaining even fragmentation among
79. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
80. E.g., Eric M. Zeman, HTC Commits to Upgrading 7 Smartphones to
Android 4.0, PHONESCOOP (Nov. 7, 2011, 10:28 AM),
http://www.phonescoop.com/articles/article.php?a=9231 (discussing HTC
product updates); Tong Zhang, IDC: Smartphone Market Growth Strong;
Samsung Leads Apple, MOBILETECHREVIEW FORUM (July 27, 2012, 9:55 AM),
http://www.mobiletechreview.com/ubbthreads/showflat.php?Number=43052.
81. See infra Part III.
82. See infra Part III.
83. E.g., Evan Niu, Visualized: The Rise and Fall of Nokia and RIM at the
Hands of Apple, MOTLEYFOOL (July 2, 2012), http://www.fool.com
/investing/general/2012/07/02/visualized-the-rise-and-fall-of-nokia-and
-rim-at-t.aspx; Peter Svensson, In Fall Apple Season, Rival Phone Makers
Struggle, YAHOO! NEWS (Sept. 5, 2012, 7:14 PM), http://news.yahoo.com
/fall-apple-season-rival-phone-makers-struggle-220719157--finance.html.
84. For a discussion of the role of winner-take-most markets in another
context, see, for example, Nicholas Economides, The Microsoft Antitrust Case:
Rejoinder, 1 J. INDUSTRY COMPETITION & TRADE 7–15 (2001); S. J. Liebowitz
& Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J.
ECON. PERSP. 133 (1994).
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many types of platforms, the mobile device markets seem to
shift substantially toward one dominant platform—at different
times Symbian’s operating system (used by Nokia), Apple’s
iOS, or Google’s Android operating system (or, in sales to
businesses, the BlackBerry OS)—as technologies (and products
built on them) evolve.85
To some extent, a large market share for the market leader
in this sector reflects classical economic factors such as scale-
related returns on large investments in technology, including
its design, needed to make an operating system (and products
based on it) work well for the complex set of consumer demands
each of these devices must satisfy.86 Another explanation for
large market share relies on the value of the whole ecosystem,
not simply one aspect such as the particular device or specific
quality of a version of the operating system, but the whole set
of applications and related devices that operate best with it.87
This was the argument for Microsoft’s dominance in the PC
realm for so many years, advanced both by those who saw that
dominance as a threat to competition and by those who saw it
as a transitory (and efficient) characteristic of this sort of
market.88
While technical explanations for market dominance
focused on economies of scope and scale doubtless capture some
of what accounts for changes in the mobile device sector, these
are not wholly satisfactory explanations.89 Other factors, such
as shifts in consumer taste and the degree of consumer
85. See, e.g., Kofi Bofah, Research in Motion Is Trading Off Hope,
SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 10, 2013, 12:06 PM), http://seekingalpha.com/article
/1105341-research-in-motion-is-trading-off-hope (suggesting a smartphone
market in which two systems dominate).
86. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and
Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 93–95 (1994); Bofah, supra note 85
(discussing Apple’s and Android’s dominance of the smartphone market).
87. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 86, at 93–94.
88. E.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in Software Markets,
in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTIRUST IN
THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 29–31 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard
eds., Kluwer 1999); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Microsoft,
Monopolization, and Network Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of
Economic Theory in Antitrust Decision Making, 40 ANTIRUST BULL. 317, 333,
335–40 (1995); William H. Page, Microsoft and the Limits of Antitrust, 6 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 33, 37–40 (2010); Richard Schmalensee, Antitrust
Issues in Schumpeterian Industries, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 192 (2000).
89. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 86, at 94.
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commitment to the systems themselves also play roles in the
results observed in this sector.90 Even though consumers do
switch from one system or platform to another, there is
resistance to such change, evidenced by surveys showing high
levels of consumer loyalty.91 But there also is a strong pull
toward the leading platform and the most popular devices that
would not be observed without consumers abandoning one
platform or product group to embrace a currently more
attractive one.92
Fourth, some (perhaps many) of the components and
methods of operation that are combined in these products are
strained fits with the core principles of the patent system—in
some cases, likely failing to satisfy central requirements of the
patent system as traditionally understood.93 Design features
for smartphones and tablet computers, at least at present, are
selected from a limited array of options, even though the ways
in which particular features are combined and the specific
mechanisms for implementing some of them leave scope for
innovation.94 For example, Apple received a patent covering the
use of a rectangular shape with rounded corners for the design
of a smartphone.95 This was a major attribute of one of Apple’s
90. See id. at 93–95, 109 (explaining how consumers benefit by only using
one network); see also Mary Beth Quirk, Apple & Amazon Top This Year’s
Brand Loyalty Survey, Blackberry Hangs on in Last Place, CONSUMERIST (Oct.
26, 2012), http://consumerist.com/2012/10/26/apple-amazon-top-this-years
-brand-loyalty-survey-blackberry-hangs-on-in-last-place/ (discussing how
Apple is rising in popularity as Blackberry is falling in popularity).
91. Quirk, supra note 90.
92. See, e.g., Michael Kan, Samsung Smartphone Sales Surge, Apple Gets
a Tiny Boost from iPhone 5s, TECHHIVE (Nov. 14, 2013, 2:10 AM),
http://www.techhive.com/article/2063540/samsung-smartphone-sales-surge
-while-apple-gets-a-small-boost-from-iphone-5s.html.
93. See infra notes 94–102 and accompanying text.
94. See JOEL R. REIDENBERG & JAMELA DEBELAK, CTR. ON LAW & INFO.
POLICY, THE IMPACT OF THE ACQUISITION AND USE OF PATENTS ON THE
SMARTPHONE INDUSTRY 21–25 (2012), available at www.wipo.int/export
/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/clip_study.pdf.
95. E.g., Chris Foresman, Apple Awarded Design Patent for Actual
Rounded Rectangle, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 7, 2012, 11:15 AM),
http://arstechnica.com/apple/2012/11/apple-awarded-design-patent-for-actual
-rounded-rectangle/. Although its consistency with patent law will no doubt be
debated, this patent grants clearer protection to the design features that were
claimed by Apple under two different patents (U.S. Patent No. 504,889 (filed
Mar. 17, 2004), U.S. Patent No. 593,087 (filed July 30, 2007)) in the litigation
with Samsung. Id.; Steve Wildstrom, Pinch-to-Zoom and Rounded Rectangles:
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design patents asserted in the litigation against Samsung.96
The rectangular-shape-with-rounded-corners claim was not
ultimately the basis for the California jury’s award,97 but the
grant of a patent for what seems so obviously one of the more
likely choices for the shape of these products exposes some of
the difficulties with design patent protections in fields like the
mobile device sector.98
More importantly, technical patents (the “utility” patents
at the core of all patent systems) also present problems in the
smartphone sector.99 In part, the problem here is the difficulty
of finding the novelty and nonobviousness required for utility
patents when so many different claims are made on so narrow
a range of technical considerations.100 The problem is not that
the case for patent protection as a spur to innovation is lower
in this area because so many of the advances most important to
smartphone and tablet functioning have already been made, or
because producers of these products in large measure
distinguish their offerings not by leaps in innovation but by
design, marketing, and smaller innovative steps.101 There are
What the Jury Didn’t Say, TECH.PINIONS (Aug. 29, 2012),
http://techpinions.com/pinch-to-zoom-and-rounded-rectangles-what-the-jury
-didnt-say/9465.
96. E.g., Ed Burnette, The Verdict Is in: Samsung vs. Apple, ZDNET (Aug.
25, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/the-verdict-is-in-samsung-vs-apple-700000
3163/; Wildstrom, supra note 95 (describing the treatment of patent claims
covering rectangular shape and rounded corners for the iPad, under design
patent U.S. Patent No. 504,889 (filed Mar. 17, 2004), and for the iPhone,
under design patent U.S. Patent No. 593,087 (filed July 30, 2007)).
97. Burnette, supra note 96.
98. See Foresman, supra note 95 (describing the Apple design as “a literal
rounded rectangle”); Anna Leach, Apple Is Granted a Patent on the Rectangle.
No, Really, REGISTER (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012
/11/08/apple_rectangle_rounded_corners/.
99. See REIDENBERG & DEBELAK, supra note 94 (using Apple as an
example to note how new entrants to the cellphone market dramatically
increase their patent portfolios, which include utility patents).
100. See id. at 13–16 (highlighting the increase in patent grants in the
cellphone market).
101. E.g., Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2012, at A1 (quoting Judge Richard Posner); James Kendrick,
Has Smartphone Technology Hit the Wall?, ZDNET (Apr. 18, 2011, 6:31 PM),
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/mobile-news/has-smartphone-technology-hit-the
-wall/1987; David Talbot, The New Smartphone Incrementalism, MIT TECH.
REV. (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/429117/the-new
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still many advances to make in this arena—in materials and
other components, in methods of operation, and in arrangement
of matter to create new options for the devices—and often these
will be secured only through the sort of investments that
intellectual property rights stimulate and reward.102
Instead, the problem in relation to the patents affecting
smartphone and tablet design and production is that the
quality of at least some patent grants is questionable, and that
lax standards in this setting magnify difficulties in a system
that cannot be error free.103 The “impacted” quality of the
patents implicated in the production of smartphones and
related devices, together with the short product cycles, high
returns to leaders, and low quality of many (though surely not
all) patents, creates a significant potential for “hold-up”
problems if the legal system does not accurately and
predictably sort through the legal claims.104 While there is a
strong case for patent protection for novel inventions,
protection for inventions that do not represent significant
advances (inventions that do not in fact meet the tests for
patent grant) generates costs without compensating social
benefit.105 The risk of a crippling damage award or injunction
that takes a key product off the market to protect a patent
claim of dubious merit is both especially serious in this setting
and especially likely, making the expected error costs of a
generally effective patent system far higher here than in much
of patent litigation.106 That may explain why such a high
-smartphone-incrementalism/ (explaining how the present cellphone market is
“less about dramatic breakthroughs . . . and more about gaining market
buzz”).
102. See generally Duhigg & Lohr, supra note 101 (quoting a statement
from a former Apple Executive: “If we can’t protect our intellectual property,
then we won’t spend millions creating products like the iPhone”).
103. Id. (noting that the patent office is “overworked, understaffed . . . [and
that] some of their work is subjective”).
104. E.g., Michael Risch, Software Patents and the Smartphone,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Nov. 15, 2012, 10:39 AM), http://prawfsblag.blogs.com/2012
/11/software-patents-and-the-smartphone.html. For a discussion on the
relation of the problematic nature of low patent quality to error rates and
types in dispute resolution, see infra Part III.
105. See Lohr, supra note 4 (“[S]martphone patent battles are enabled by
lots of trivial patents . . . . In the end, consumers may be the losers.”).
106. See id. (“Smartphones are very different. An infringement ruling can
slow a rival down for a few months . . . .”).
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proportion of patent litigation targets makers of smartphones
and related devices.107
III. TROLLING FOR ANSWERS IN THE THICKET
A. NEW ORUSED: SOLUTIONS TO THE SMARTPHONE PATENT
PROBLEM
While the four factors described in Part II taken together
explain why the smartphone patent wars have broken out and
why there is widespread concern about them, finding solutions
requires something more. After all, some aspects of the mobile
device business that contribute to the problems seen in the
smartphone wars—the complexity and rapid evolution of
products, for example—are neither subject to change through
the legal system nor suitable bases for altering the basic rules
that currently guide that system.108
The attributes of the smartphone business that affect
patent litigation need to be understood for what they say about
the broader patent (and patent dispute) system rather than
seen as reasons for creating a special set of rules. This is true
because without understanding the roles played by the
different factors, it is not possible to appreciate what changes
might be helpful or to have a sound basis for deciding which
firms, types of patents, or types of disputes should qualify for
special treatment.109 More generally, most efforts to address
problems in one area of the law identified by a set of intuitively
selected characteristics through creation of separate rules—for
the mobile device sector or for firms in sectors where products
change quickly, for instance—commonly can be expected to
raise administrative costs and to generate additional
problems.110
107. E.g., id. (describing how patent litigation follows “every industrial
innovation,” but the smartphone market is “bigger, global and unusually
complex”).
108. E.g., Risch, supra note 104. These features, however, certainly would
inform application of the rules, for example in the calculation of damages for
infringement and in the evaluation of requests for particular forms of
injunctive relief under the four-factor test reiterated in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
109. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 208 (arguing that it is unknown if certain features of
the existing intellectual property laws are optimal).
110. See id. at 215–16.
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Judge Frank Easterbrook has driven this point home by
analogy to the notion of crafting a distinct “law of the horse” (a
metaphor he attributes to former Chicago Dean and Stanford
President Gerhard Casper) in place of reliance on generally
applicable doctrines of tort, contract, and so on, to deal with the
plethora of legal problems that came with the roles of horses in
Western societies.111 As Judge Easterbrook has explained in
answering calls for a special law of cyberspace, rules often can
be tailored to fit changes in the nature of cases and can shift
between more specific rule-type and more abstract standard-
type approaches, but problems that arise in new contexts
almost always are resolved better through the application of
existing legal constructs instead of creating new ones
wholesale.112
Instead of separate rules, looking for answers to the
smartphone patent wars requires sorting through the asserted
problems to see which characteristics of the patent system, the
entities interacting with it, or the mechanisms for resolving
disputes about it are truly problematic and which legal rules
can be addressed effectively without causing more harm.113
This Part and Part IV are preliminary efforts in that vein.
B. THAT’S THE THICKET: TRANSACTION COSTS ANDHOLD-UPS
The predicate for concerns about patents in the
smartphone sector is the notion that there is a patent thicket, a
large number of overlapping patents in the same technological
space.114 Adam Mossoff summarizes the concerns associated
with this phenomenon: a patent thicket “increases transaction
costs, accentuates hold-out problems, and precipitates costly
111. Id. at 207–08.
112. See id. at 207–08, 215–16 (“[T]he best way to learn the law applicable
to specialized endeavors is to study general rules.”). On movement (and trade-
offs) between rule-based and standard-based approaches, see, for example,
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND LIFE 137–45
(1991); Colin S. Diver, Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J.
65 (1983); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
113. See infra Parts III, IV.
114. See Shapiro, supra note 72, at 119–22. But see Mossoff, supra note 72,
at 204–05 (emphasizing other cost-related issues that might be used to define
a patent thicket, irrespective of the number of overlapping patents).
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litigation, which prevents commercial development . . . .
Additionally, a patent thicket can block new research into
follow-on inventions.”115
The transaction cost (or administrative cost) problem
exists because of the time, effort, and expense that would be
needed to identify all the patent claims that might be infringed,
evaluate the probability that specific patent claims are both
valid and infringed, assess whether to use alternative methods
of operation or substitute components to avoid the possible
infringement, find the holders of the patent rights, and
negotiate licenses for particular uses of the patented items or
methods.116 These costs are apt to rise exponentially with the
number of potential patent claims and rise as well with the
difficulty of sorting through potential claims (an issue tied,
among other things, to problems associated with resolution of
questions of novelty and nonobviousness of claimed inventions
in an innovation space with many overlapping claims).117 It is
no surprise that this is a special problem in the context of
smartphones and similar mobile devices, given the extensive
array of complicated technologies combined in them.118
The hold-up problem is that each patent holder who seeks
to enforce patent rights has the prospect of stopping sales of
the accused products.119 That threat, in turn, allows each
enforcing entity to potentially extract the full value of the sales
loss during whatever time an accused product would be off the
115. See Mossoff, supra note 72, at 167 (describing, but not endorsing,
claims respecting problems of patent thickets).
116. The term “transaction cost” as used here includes costs sometimes
separately labeled “information costs.” E.g., Clarisa Long, Information Costs
in Patent and Copyright, 90 VAND. L. REV. 465, 465–71 (2004).
117. Novelty and nonobviousness are core elements of patentability. CASS
&HYLTON, supra note 31, at 63–69.
118. See, e.g., Risch, supra note 104 (noting that the devices include,
among other things: “a general purpose computer and all that comes with it
(CPU, RAM, I/O interface, operating system, etc.); active matrix display; touch
screen display; cellular voice technology; 1x data networking; 3G data
networking; 4G data networking; Wi-Fi data networking; Bluetooth data
networking; GPS technology (and associated navigation); accelerometer
technology; digital camera (including lens and image processing); audio
recording and playback; battery technology; [and] force feedback technology
(phone vibration and haptic feedback)”) (punctuation and capitalization
altered from original).
119. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2008–09 (2007).
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market.120 The risks that come with efforts to assemble a
product from a large number of patented or patentable
components and methods owned by different patentees is
analogous to the risk that attends efforts to assemble a large
amount of land for a development project when the land is
owned by many different people. In the land development
context, a single landholder holding out for a higher payment
in theory can extract the full value represented by all holders of
parcels needed for the project—which is the now-standard
explanation for allowing governments to take property by
eminent domain (subject to provision for reasonable
compensation).121 In the patent context, this hold-up risk rises
sharply with the number of patents and patent holders.122
C. PATENT POOLS AND CROSS-LICENSES
Despite the issues associated with patent thickets, and the
considerable amount of attention it has drawn in the scholarly
literature, that feature in itself is not apt to point toward a
solution to the smartphone patent wars. In part, focusing on
problems of patent thickets is not likely to be rewarding
because there is little chance of avoiding a thicket of some
dimension in the smartphone arena.123 This focus also is not
likely to yield returns to policymakers because, as with many
problems that are extremely scary in theory, the most obvious
problems associated with patent thickets already have been
significantly tamed in practice.
120. Id. at 2001–02.
121. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (Harvard Univ. Press 1985) (explaining
the basis for eminent domain powers as a cure for hold-up risks). The analogy
between the two settings is illustrative but imperfect, as the hold-up risk
comes at different junctures; that the potential for a hold-up after a complex
product incorporating many different patented components and methods is on
the market does not necessarily imply similarly strong bargaining power for
the various patentees at the time a product is being designed. See Einer
Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically
Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535, 568 (2008). But the
same is true in different measure for land development projects as well, given
the developer’s ability to select different sites ex ante. See EPSTEIN, supra.
122. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 119, at 2044, 2046–48 (describing
the “royalty stacking” problem that comes from hold-up with multiple
patentees enforcing patent rights respecting the same end-product).
123. See, e.g., Risch, supra note 104 (listing the many features and
technologies involved in cellphones).
28 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 16:1
Two dominant means of dealing with transaction cost and
hold-up problems in similar settings have been used for many
years. One is for firms holding patents for products and
processes that are useful parts of larger, complex products to
share the patents in patent pools that allow a set of firms to
use any patented product or process, under what is essentially
a type of blanket license, without need for separate negotiation
and individualized consent.124 The other is for firms holding the
patents to cross-license their patent portfolios (or at least
categories of patents within that portfolio), agreeing either not
to charge one another for infringing uses of the patents or to
allow broad categories of use, perhaps with a side payment if
one firm’s patents are significantly more valuable than
another’s.125 Neither mechanism requires specification of
individual patent claims, of the uses covered, or of payments
owed for specifically identified infringements, greatly reducing
the transaction costs of dealing with large numbers of
potentially infringed patents and simultaneously reducing
litigation threats.126
Professor Carl Shapiro recognizes that there are practical
ways for the problems associated with patent thickets to be
solved (or at least significantly ameliorated) by would-be users
and patent holders, but worries that overly aggressive antitrust
enforcement can “mak[e] it difficult for patentees possessing
complementary and potentially blocking patents to coordinate
to engage in cross licensing, package licensing, or to form
patent pools.”127 The problem that concerns antitrust
authorities is that the pools and cross-licenses can encompass
124. See Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property
Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY
123, 129–33 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2001);
Jeffrey Fromm, Senior Mgmt. Counsel, Hewlett-Packard, Address at the
Department of Justice Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission
Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the
Knowledge Based Economy: Cross-Licensing and Patent Pools 17 (Apr. 17,
2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public
_events/competition-ip-law-policy-knowledge-based-economy-hearings/020417
trans.pdf.
125. See, e.g., Fromm, supra note 124.
126. See, e.g., id. at 255, 274 (“Obviously we don’t want to turn this into
another form of litigation. That’s not the purpose of pools. It is to avoid
litigation.”).
127. Shapiro, supra note 72, at 144.
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substitute products or processes as well as complementary
products or processes, allowing firms to use these mechanisms
as tools for suppressing competition rather than merely
lowering costs to make competition more efficient.128 Antitrust
enforcers are rightly concerned about this potential, but the
obvious utility of cross-licensing and voluntary patent-pooling
to solving transaction cost problems in a range of settings
should counsel enforcers generally to resist challenging this
conduct.129 Excessive enforcement activity (including
investigations as well as prosecutions) undoubtedly will
discourage socially beneficial uses of these mechanisms.130 Fear
of unduly aggressive antitrust enforcement is not limited to
this context, but—because agreement among competing or
potentially competing firms is likely—it may present special
concerns for enterprises contemplating patent pools or cross-
licenses.131
In contrast to Professor Shapiro, James Bessen contends
that even if the hold-up and transaction cost problems can be
solved and there are no concerns about excessive antitrust
activity, patent thickets still discourage innovation.132 His
argument, based on calculation of the optimal willingness of
industry leaders to cross-license in stylized market settings, is
that in markets characterized by low patent standards and low
returns to innovative first-movers, patent thickets will develop
and cross-licensing will actually reduce returns to innovation
128. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE& FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 75,
at 74–77 (discussing substitutes within a patent pool); Joel I. Klein, Acting
Assistant Attorney Gen. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address Before
the American Intellectual Property Law Association: Cross-Licensing and
Antitrust Law (May 2, 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public
/speeches/1118.htm (“I also believe that there are some cross-licenses in place
now that, had we been aware of them at the time of their inception, we might
have sought to block under the antitrust laws.”).
129. See Klein, supra note 128, at 3 (“I would expect that by far most cross-
licenses and pools are, on balance, procompetitive.”).
130. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 72, at 119 (“Antitrust law and
enforcement, with its historical hostility to cooperation among horizontal
rivals, can easily add to these transaction costs.”); Fromm, supra note 124; see
also Cass, supra note 40, at 191–99 (discussing the role of excessive
inclination to initiate investigations in discouraging desirable business
conduct).
131. See Klein, supra note 128, at 3 (discussing that two competing firms
may have an incentive to cross-license at the expense of the public).
132. Bessen, supra note 72, at 17–20.
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below the ideal level.133 Contrary to the more frequently
expressed complaints that patent thickets stifle innovation by
handcuffing new firms that cannot efficiently negotiate their
way around the mass of existing patents, this work suggests
that patent thickets stifle innovation by encouraging excessive
cross-licensing.134
The academic literature, thus, argues that patent pools
and cross-licensing may be bad either because they occur too
frequently or because they do not occur frequently enough (a
kind of reverse “Goldilocks” problem).135 Notwithstanding the
scope of the criticism, there is little concrete evidence that
problems associated with these problem-solving arrangements
carry social costs greater than their benefits.136 Further, the
“damned if you do, damned if you don’t” character of arguments
against cross-licensing and patent pooling suggests that the
case for changes to the law to discourage cross-licensing or
voluntary patent pooling is far from securely established—
otherwise the two sets of arguments against these practices
would not work at cross purposes.137
Similar weakness affects much of the argument that
substantial changes in the law are needed to reduce the costs of
patent thickets as a general proposition, apart from other
attributes of the particular litigants, patents, or specific
elements in dispute (for example, by restricting patent
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1–4, 18–20; see also Tim Worstall, Does Apple’s HTC Patents
Settlement Doom the Samsung Case?, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2012, 12:57 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/11/17/links-17-nov-does-apples-h
tc-patents-settlement-doom-the-samsung-case/ (highlighting the substantial
licensing deal between Apple and HTC).
135. Compare Bessen, supra note 72, at 17–20 (suggesting cross-licensing
occurs too frequently), with Shapiro, supra note 72, at 144 (expressing
concerns that regulation may cause cross-licensing to occur too infrequently).
136. See Shapiro, supra note 72, at 126–30, 134–36 (discussing the
numerous benefits offered by patent pools and cross-licensing).
137. Explanations of the role that patent pools and cross-licensing play in
reducing the ill-effects of patent thickets, together with indications that
royalty-setting arrangements may differ significantly from those assumed in
theories supporting complaints about the effects of patent thickets, make the
case that more needs to be done to establish a basis for altering present rules.
E.g., Elhauge, supra note 121; Merges, supra note 124; Doug Lichtman, Patent
Holdouts in the Standard-Setting Process (Univ. Chi. Law Sch. Working Paper
No. 292, 2006), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/ files/files/292.pdf;
Fromm supra note 124.
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remedies).138 This argument subsumes the claim that the
proposed changes would pose little risk of collateral harm to
innovation and an economy increasingly based on
innovation.139 Academic speculations on the subject are
interesting and in some respects instructive, but their
conclusions depend heavily on the assumptions that each
author makes at the outset.140 Costs of the current regime are
hard to quantify and so are the costs of altering the regime,
whether by limiting opportunities to engage in the most
common cooperative arrangements or by restricting litigation
rights.141
138. See, e.g., James Boyle, Open Source Innovation, Patent Injunctions,
and the Public Interest, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 30, 59–61 (2012) (suggesting
the ITC should limit the use of injunctive remedies); Heller & Eisenberg,
supra note 72; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 119, at 1992–95 (describing how
a threat of injunction greatly increases negotiating power).
139. The point made in the text—that much of the cost-benefit analysis of
changing the law is as of now indeterminate—does not reach possible
administrative changes in patent awarding that might be made even without
changes to the patent law in order to address concerns about patent quality,
changes that, in addition to strengthening patent quality, might reduce the
density of patent thickets. See infra Part IV. Even with a significant change in
patent standards implemented through the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
however, devices such as smartphones inescapably will be embedded in patent
thickets—these devices simply incorporate too many complicated and
interrelated technologies to avoid that outcome. See, e.g., Risch, supra note
104 (listing many of the features contained in a typical cellphone).
140. That point is made especially clear in Elhauge, supra note 121, at 537,
with respect to one of the foundational pieces in the patent thicket literature.
Of course, sensitivity to background assumptions is not peculiar to this
specific literature; in analysis of almost any complicated social phenomenon
(which, almost by definition, is not subject to actual testing in the same
manner as many physical phenomena), framing assumptions play a critical
role. See, e.g., Günter Knieps & Ingo Vogelsang, The Sustainability Concept
Under Alternative Behavioral Assumptions, 13 BELL J. ECON. 234, 235 (1982)
(exploring the Bertand assumption as it relates to sustainability); Michael
Spence, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure: A Review
Article, 21 J. ECON. LITERATURE 981 (1983) (reviewing WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET
AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
(1982)) (using various assumptions in an analysis of the theory of contestable
markets). This does not deny that simplifying assumptions can be useful to
analysis, but assumptions can, and often do, drive conclusions. See, e.g.,
Ernest Nagel, Assumptions in Economic Theory, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 211
(1963).
141. See John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 2111, 2118–24 (2007) (providing historical context for the difficulty of
determining costs and benefits of patent policy).
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In the absence of robust data, policy analysis should be
rooted in basic precepts of support for private property rights
and voluntary exchanges—precepts that, where they have been
the basis for law and policy, have fairly consistently been
associated with economic success.142 Firms that have an
interest in reducing litigation risks to their own operations
commonly are open to negotiating agreements with others that
reciprocally reduce the threat of patent litigation to them.143
These mutually acceptable agreements, like voluntary
exchanges in general, can be expected to be beneficial to the
parties and, except in extreme cases where they implement
efforts to reduce competition, to be socially beneficial as well.144
These arrangements, which are seen among competing
smartphone producers (even those that have engaged in patent
contests),145 do not completely solve problems associated with
the current smartphone wars, but they generally constitute
steps in the right direction.
D. NON-PRACTICING ENTITIES (NPES)
The transaction cost and, especially, hold-up problems with
patent thickets, however, are less easily resolved when the
142. See, e.g., ROBERT J. BARRO, DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A
CROSS-COUNTRY EMPIRICAL STUDY (MIT Press 1997) (examining the general
relationship between property rights and economic success and more
complicated relationship to economic growth rates); MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (Univ. of Chi. Press 1962) (discussing economic
success and personal freedom); Enrico Colombatto, Are Property Rights
Relevant for Development Economics? On the Dangers of Western
Constructivism, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS 251–69 (Enrico Colombatto ed., 2004). A fairly good approximation of
the correlation between property rights and economic success can be seen by
comparing the rankings in TERRY MILLER ET AL., 2013 INDEX OF ECONOMIC
FREEDOM: PROMOTING ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY (Heritage
Found. 2013), available at http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2013/book/index
_2013.pdf, with national rankings by per capita GDP in GDP Per Capita
(Current US$), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2011+wbapi_data_value+wbapi
_data_value-last&sort=asc (last visited Oct. 12, 2014) (noting that correlation
is especially pronounced if adjusted for effects of large oil reserves in nations
with relatively unstable governments).
143. See, e.g., Ian Sherr, Apple, HTC Settle Patent Dispute, Sign Licensing
Pact, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2012, 3:52 PM), http://online.wsj.com
/news/articles/SB10001424127887324894104578111792346747174 (describing
the licensing deal Apple and HTC signed in order to end litigation).
144. Klein, supra note 128, at 3–4.
145. See, e.g., Sherr, supra note 143.
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enterprises involved have sharply divergent interests.146 Build-
and-let-build accords work only if both parties have equivalent
interest in building.147 The Federal Trade Commission singled
out entities that do not use patents to make products
themselves—commonly called non-practicing entities (NPEs)—
for special criticism as contributing to excessive litigation.148
Additionally, four Justices, concurring in the Supreme Court’s
eBay decision, cautioned that firms that “use patents not as a
basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for
obtaining licensing fees” will be less likely to satisfy the
requirements for injunctive relief when they assert patent
rights.149
Since that time, courts addressing complaints from NPEs
frequently have referred to a plaintiff’s non-practicing status in
assessing the propriety of injunctive relief and have denied
injunctions for patent infringement in a substantial proportion
of cases.150 A growing chorus of commentary has advocated
going further, proposing that courts deny or sharply curtail
injunctions to NPEs.151 Commentators have observed that the
number and cost of NPE suits is rising.152 Two scholars put a
figure of $29 billion on the direct cost of NPE suits in 2011,153
146. See Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market Makers? An Empirical
Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 125 (2010).
147. Id.
148. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 31–32 (2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (discussing the
characteristics of NPEs).
149. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395–97 (2006)
(Kennedy, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, J.J., concurring); FED. TRADE COMM’N,
supra note 148, at 31–32, 38–43.
150. E.g., Benjamin N. Simler & Scott McClelland, A Model for Predicting
Permanent Injunctions After eBay v. MercExchange, 5 BLOOMBERG L. REP.—
INTELL. PROP., no. 15, 2011 (“[T]he percentage of cases in which an injunction
is entered is in stark contrast to pre-Ebay statistics . . . .”).
151. E.g., Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex
Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
297 (2010); James R. Farrand, Territoriality and Incentives Under the Patent
Laws: Overreaching Harms U.S. Economic and Technological Interests, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1215 (2006); Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and
Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1809 (2007); Bruce Sewell, Troll Call, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2006, at A14.
152. See infra notes 153–54.
153. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from
NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 388–91 (arguing that patent litigation
costs associated with NPEs are larger than many observers believe and that
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and some studies have found the proportion of NPE suits
climbing sharply in recent years.154
However, increasing costs and growing numbers of suits
are the general case for U.S. patent holders (NPE or not), as
one would expect in a world where innovation increasingly
drives large segments of the economy.155 Patent litigation is
costly, both to the plaintiff and to the defendant, regardless of
the identity of the plaintiff.156 Look at the suits involving Apple
and Samsung, for example; these two non-NPE litigants have
doubtless spent far more on litigation than any NPE.157
Moreover, the common assumption of the relative willingness
of NPEs to litigate is not necessarily evidence of strategic
behavior. It may instead reflect asymmetries in the efficiency of
NPEs versus other entities at litigating (due to organizational
issues, scope of an enterprise’s work, or other factors) or in the
nature of relationships between the patent holder and the
these are largely social losses, not transfers among firms); see also EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION ANDU.S. INNOVATION 5 (2013),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report
.pdf (describing the increasing prevalence of “PAE suits, and patent suits in
general, in recent years”). But see David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan,
Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 425 (2014) (arguing that the NPE litigation cost number
arrived at by Bessen & Meurer is unreasonably high and at best states the
upper bound of possibilities).
154. Sara Jeruss et al., The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent
Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 361
(2012).
155. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Patent Litigation and the Internet,
STAN. TECH. L. REV., 2012, at 1, 1 n.2 (highlighting changes from 2001 to
2009); Alan Marco et al., Do Economic Downturns Dampen Patent Litigation?
2–4 (5th Annual Conference on Emprical Legal Studies Paper, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1641425
(reviewing growth in patent litigation in connection with divergent effects of
different types of economic downturns on patent litigation); Jim Kerstetter,
How Much Is That Patent Lawsuit Going to Cost You?, CNET (Apr. 5, 2012,
10:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-32973_3-57409792-296/how-much-is-th
at-patent-lawsuit-going-to-cost-you/ (reporting results of a survey by the
American Intellectual Property Law Association).
156. See Allison et al., supra note 155. This does not mean that costs for
patent litigation are symmetrical for plaintiffs and defendants, especially costs
associated with discovery, or that costs have increased proportionately for
both plaintiffs and defendants across all classes of plaintiff and all types of
patents.
157. E.g., Duhigg & Lohr, supra note 101.
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putative infringer.158 The possible efficiency explanations for
NPE litigation do not necessarily prove that NPEs are equally
good candidates for strong patent protections as other
patentees (from a social welfare perspective), but something
more than has been offered thus far is needed to make the case
that curtailing injunctions for NPEs as a class is beneficial.159
Certainly, critics of NPE litigation are right that NPEs are
less likely to engage in quid pro quo cross-licensing or similar
arrangements that do not involve straightforward payment of
royalties as an alternative to patent infringement litigation.160
The absence of that alternative will affect some of the costs
associated with patent litigation and, ultimately, with use of
products and processes that are or might be covered by
patents.161 But the notion that the enforcement of patents held
by NPEs is especially costly, or that NPE suits generally should
be viewed with suspicion, is easily overstated.162
NPEs include universities and similar research facilities,
independent inventors and small businesses, companies that
are changing business focus from one sector to another, and
firms that principally operate as purchasers and enforcers of
patent rights.163 Universities are better suited to research than
to turning ideas into products and selling them in commercial
158. See, e.g., Vincenzo Denicolò et al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief:
Interpreting eBay in High-tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders,
4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 571, 585–89 (2008) (describing “Non-
Manufacturing, Non-Competing Patent Holders”); Golden, supra note 141, at
2132 (discussing information asymmetries in patent litigation); Kieff, supra
note 29; Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software
Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 1005 (2005) (explaining that IBM’s “relative
lenience” may be attributed to “asymmetric risks”); Shrestha, supra note 146,
at 129 (“NPEs are well positioned to solve this informational
asymmetry . . . .”).
159. See Denicolò et al., supra note 158, at 576–77 (warning that creating
too strong of rules for granting injunctive relief in relation to NPEs has the
possibility of “undercompensating innovation”).
160. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 148, at 31 (suggesting that an “NPEs’
invulnerability may create a competitive problem if it prevents the type of
cross-licensing that has evolved as a ‘safety valve’”).
161. Id. at 30–33 (discussing the potential costs associated with NPEs and
patent amassing strategies).
162. See Denicolò et al., supra note 158, at 576.
163. See, e.g., Shrestha, supra note 146, at 117 n.16. Special considerations
respecting this last group of NPEs are addressed in the section immediately
following. See infra Part III.E.
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markets.164 So are many other NPEs, such as small businesses
that generate innovations that are more efficiently
commercialized by others that have established production
facilities and marketing networks.165
Denying all of these NPEs remedies that are generally
available to patent holders simply because they are less apt to
engage in cross-licensing or patent pooling arrangements
diminishes the likely value of NPEs’ patents.166 Exclusive
rights to control patented items are rarely enforced as
effectively with only a damages remedy instead of the full
panoply of rights.167 That should be obvious: if damages were
as useful in all cases as injunctive relief, there would be no
reason for plaintiffs to ask for injunctive relief and no reason
for potential defendants to be concerned about that remedy.
The inducement to innovate that patent rights represent,
hence, is not as strong if NPEs do not enjoy rights to injunctive
as well as damages relief.168
Even if costs associated with injunctive relief are greater in
suits by NPEs as a class than in other patent suits (an open
question), more critical questions remain: (1) what are the
relative magnitudes likely to be for those costs and for costs
entailed in limiting relief; and (2) do the most cost-effective
limitations on relief apply across that class or in a subset of
NPE suits? The real problems firms risking accusations of
patent infringement face with transaction costs and hold-ups
have already been noted.169 The costs associated with the risk
of hold-up and with transacting around patent rights issues,
however, are not likely to be the same for all NPEs or all
patents.170 Enforcement of a patent on a major innovation
pioneered by a university research facility, for example, would
not pose the same hold-up and transaction cost issues as those
associated with a firm intent on extracting the maximum
164. See Shrestha, supra note 146, at 127 (discussing how certain NPE
entities “lack the necessary resources to develop and market a product”).
165. Id.
166. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 148, at ch. 2, 31–32.
167. See, e.g., Denicolò et al., supra note 158, at 577–83 (describing the
benefits of injunctive relief); Shrestha, supra note 146, at 134 (“Without the
threat of an injunction, smaller entities may not be able to bargain for fair
licensing fees.”).
168. See Denicolò et al., supra note 158, at 574–76.
169. See Shrestha, supra note 146, at 124.
170. See id.
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revenue by strategic assertion of rights to patents covering
small advances in functions used as a minor input to
numerous, complex products.171 The university-generated
major patent would be more likely than the comparison patent
to be known in advance of the potentially infringing conduct,
less likely to be used strategically to extract money from
possible infringers, and new constraints on enforcement of such
patents would be more apt to impinge on significant
investments associated with innovation.172 What does that
suggest for policy and for legal rules? This Part continues to
examine potential distinctions among types of plaintiffs;
distinctions among types of patent claims are addressed in Part
IV.
E. PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES (PAES)
Recognizing that all NPEs are not the same, critics of
overly aggressive patent enforcement have recently narrowed
their focus to a subset of NPEs, firms labeled patent assertion
entities (PAEs).173 These are the firms that purchase patent
rights primarily for the purpose of extracting payments from
enterprises that use the patented products or processes to
produce goods.174 This is the category of enterprise that
generally attracts the label of “patent troll” (or worse).175 The
poster child for bad results from suits by PAEs is the NTP-RIM
(now BlackBerry) case. The short version of the story is this:
NTP sued RIM for patent infringement, won in federal district court,
and obtained an injunction that would have shuttered Blackberry
service in the United States. Although the injunction was suspended
during negotiations between the litigants, the judge made clear that
he was not going to deny injunctive relief just to avoid the problems
that it would cause Blackberry users. NTP won a huge settlement
(almost twenty times the amount the judge fixed as the reasonable
value of royalties for the infringed patents), even as its patents were
171. See id. at 140–44.
172. This may also explain, in part at least, the findings of a study showing
that NPE-asserted patents tended to be of higher value than other patents as
measured by citations in scientific literature. See id.
173. E.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 153; Jeruss et al.,
supra note 154, at 367–72. Although the increased attention to these entities
is relatively recent, the term dates back at least to the FTC’s 2003 report. FED.
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 148, at 31 (referring to “patent assertion firms”).
174. Jeruss et al., supra note 154, at 367.
175. See, e.g., Sewell, supra note 151; Wu, supra note 18.
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being reviewed and rejected as invalid by examiners in the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office.176
The difference between the value assessed by the judge
and the settlement RIM reached with NTP plainly reflects the
value RIM placed on avoiding a shutdown of its service.177
That, in essence, is the difference between the availability of an
injunctive remedy as opposed to a damages remedy. Damages
can be insufficient to provide protection to rights holders if
courts set the number lower than the value the rights holder
places on allowing use of the patented item or process, or
damages can be excessive (witness the Apple-Samsung
verdict).178 In this instance, however, the reason the settlement
figure greatly exceeded the court’s assessment of value
probably was not that NTP viewed the innovation as having
more economic worth than RIM or the court (a common barrier
to negotiating agreements in many settings).179 Instead, the
much higher settlement amount reflected NTP’s ability to
leverage the threat of shuttering RIM’s BlackBerry service,
with attendant losses of not only immediate use but future use
as well.180
While the extra return to the patent holder as a result of
the threatened injunction was widely noted, observers were
even more struck by the fact that NTP was free to push for the
shutdown of BlackBerry service because it had nothing to lose
in relations with RIM.181 Some NPEs, such as universities or
other research facilities, may have reasons to seek
accommodations with patent infringers broadly similar to
motivations for business enterprises that use one another’s
patented innovations.182 Universities, for example, may receive
176. CASS&HYLTON, supra note 31, at 162 (footnotes omitted).
177. E.g., id.; Wu, supra note 18.
178. See Shrestha, supra note 146, at 134 (“[D]amages . . . are notoriously
difficult to calculate and may well undercompensate the patent owner.”)
(footnotes omitted); Lowensohn, supra note 1.
179. See CASS&HYLTON, supra note 31, at 162.
180. Wu, supra note 18.
181. See, e.g., Chien, supra note 151, at 318; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note
119, at 2009; Sewell, supra note 151 (noting that NTP does not make a
competitive product nor is it “even in the business of making products”); Wu,
supra note 18 (explaining that NTP has no products or employees).
182. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 615 (2008) (describing
universities as NPEs, noting that “their incentives in dealing with the patent
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(or seek) philanthropic gifts from potential targets of patent
enforcement or from individuals (alumni most often) associated
with those enterprises.183 Educational and research institutions
also might value freedom from limitations on their use of
various patent-protected inputs in pursuit of their own
teaching and research functions, giving these entities another
incentive to reach reciprocal licensing arrangements.184 These
interests will not necessarily produce the same level of
willingness to reach agreement on cross-licensing or similar
means for reducing prospects for litigation—and particularly
for enforcement of rights through remedies that are especially
costly to the targets of litigation—as would be expected for
many commercial enterprises.185 NPE interests of this sort
should, however, moderate risks associated with enforcement of
patent rights in settings such as the NTP-RIM case.186
PAEs, in contrast, seem wholly free from similar
constraints. Their principal focus is on patent enforcement, and
their own economic success correlates positively and directly
with the magnitude of the sums they can extract through
litigation or threat of litigation.187 As a rule, PAEs do not have
any apparent incentive to limit the claims they make or to
refrain from the most aggressive enforcement of patent
rights.188 Aggressive enforcement that imposes asymmetrically
high costs on defendants may be especially useful to PAEs.189
system align in many ways with those of private-sector patent licensing
shops”).
183. See, e.g., id. at 616–17 (“Second, the companies with which
[universities] are negotiating often want exclusivity. They are especially likely
to get it if the company in question is a faculty-organized startup.”).
184. E.g., Chien, supra note 151, at 327–28 (“Research and development
entities, for example, use patent license fees to fund technology
development . . . .”).
185. See generally id. at 328 (“However, with their large patent portfolios,
R&D entities are well poised to shift their emphasis to enforcement.”).
186. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 182, at 629 (“One of the differences
between universities and private licensing shops is that universities are, by
and large, not engaged in hiding the ball, waiting until people have developed
an industry and then popping up and demanding a disproportionate share of
royalties based on irreversible investments.”).
187. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 153, at 1.
188. Id. at 1, 6; FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE:
ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION ch. 2, ch. 8
(2011).
189. E.g., Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact on American Innovation
and Jobs, and Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the H.R. Subcomm. on
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These observations have supported calls for limitation of
injunctive relief to PAEs to prevent the sort of result reached in
the NTP-RIM litigation.190
The question for policymakers is whether the relative
freedom for PAEs to push for patent enforcement in ways that
might produce excessively large payments or undue disruption
to functions of firms using patented technologies, components,
or methods of operation, justifies special restrictions on PAEs
or on the relief available to them.191 That is not an easy
question. It cannot be answered simply by pointing to specific
examples where PAEs were overcompensated for the value of
the patent rights asserted or where patent assertions disrupted
legitimate commercial operations—those examples can point
toward potential answers if they are typical of a broader class
of cases where PAE litigation results in net social costs, but
they will not likely be the entire story.
The question requires balancing the costs of excessive
enforcement against the costs of under-enforcement.192 Neither
is readily pinned down.193 PAEs necessarily should be expected
to be more efficient enforcers of patent rights than those whose
rights they acquire; and they also can serve useful arbitrage,
funding, and research-promotion functions.194 If patent rights
would be under-enforced without the operation of PAEs, and
especially to the extent that under-enforcement in this context
would reduce efficient research incentives, efforts to cut back
on PAE remedies would reduce social welfare.195 The costs of
patent litigation are often cited as evidence that patent
litigation imposes excessive burdens on firms seeking to use
patented products and processes (potential defendants in
Courts, Intellectual Prop. & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
113th Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of John Boswell); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, supra note 153, at 6–7.
190. E.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 188, at ch. 8; Chien, supra note
151, at 310.
191. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 188, at 220–21.
192. See infra notes 193–200.
193. See Golden, supra note 141, at 2118 (arguing that “a simplistic view of
patents’ benefits and costs cannot be correct”).
194. E.g., Denicolò et al., supra note 158, at 575; Golden, supra note 141, at
2117; Shrestha, supra note 146, at 130–31.
195. See Golden, supra note 141, at 2117 (arguing that “a categorically
discriminatory market for patent rights may slow, rather than promote,
progress”).
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patent litigation), but these costs also could deter desirable
patent enforcement actions.196 They also can discourage at
least some undesirable patent suits.197 In other words,
litigation costs are likely to have complex effects on public
welfare, some good, some bad; the real issues have to do with
what the costs represent and how they affect behavior.198 If
litigation costs discourage “frivolous” litigation, fine; if
litigation imposes asymmetric costs that allow PAEs to extract
excessive settlements from productive firms that practice
methods or use components that might infringe patent rights,
these costs have a very different social impact.
Even PAE enforcement activity that produces costs in
excess of merited returns for the value of patents in the
individual case, as certainly appears to have happened in the
NTP-RIM example, could simply balance under-enforcement
elsewhere in the patent system—perhaps not even fully
offsetting under-enforcement. While enterprises that want to
use technologies arguably subject to patent protection do face
high transaction costs in settings like the mobile device
market, the patent owners frequently face correlatively high
transaction costs in identifying infringing uses of their
technologies and resolving disputes over them.199 These costs
very likely will be particularly discouraging to many of the
types of enterprise found among NPEs, such as independent
196. See, e.g., BESSEN&MEURER, supra note 11, at 120–32.
197. Of course, the lower the bar is set to filing suit and the more quickly
costs can be shifted to defendants, the less likely this effect is to be significant.
E.g., Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 371, 376 n.9 (1986); Peter S. Menell, A Note on Private Versus Social
Incentives to Sue in a Costly Legal System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 41, 43 (1983).
198. See, e.g., Kaplow supra note 197, at 385.
199. Costs of identifying infringements and resolving disputes are distinct
from costs of filing suit. Where the former costs are high, there also is
additional incentive to use alternatives, such as scatter-shot letters asserting
potential infringement, without factual investigation to support the
accusation. E.g., William J. Francis, Lodsys Targets App Developers Over
Infringement Claims, TECHREPUBLIC (Aug. 25, 2011, 6:10 AM),
http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/software-engineer/lodsys-targets-app-devel
opers-over-patent-infringement-claims/. The almost exclusive use of this
technique by PAEs, however, suggests that factors other than the cost of
determining the identity of actual infringers are significant. E.g., Joe Mullin,
Wi-Fi Patent Troll Hit with Racketeering Suit Emerges Unscathed, ARS
TECHNICA (Feb. 13, 2013, 9:05 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy
/2013/02/wi-fi-patent-troll-hit-with-novel-anti-racketeering-charges-emerges-u
nscathed/.
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inventors, small businesses, and academic researchers. In this
context, there is a significant risk of under-enforcement in
parts of the system aside from the activities of PAEs.200
Another element critical to evaluation of the functioning of
the current system of patent rights enforcement, and
ultimately to disposition of the controversy about PAE
enforcement rights, is the error rate and distribution—the
degree to which litigation produces erroneous decisions and the
types of errors produced.201 As scholarship on the economics of
litigation makes clear, lawsuit activity cannot be evaluated
without attention to the frequency and nature of the errors
made in sorting through legal claims and also the impact those
errors have on the activities that lie behind the suits.202
If the legal system works well, courts will sort through the
suits, dismiss those that are baseless relatively quickly, and
dispose of the remaining suits in line with the merits;
investment in litigation by both sides generally will be scaled
in response to perceptions of a suit’s merit (lower spending on
suits that are less apt to succeed), and the efficiency and
accuracy of systems that work well will tend to induce both
investment in litigation and in background activities that
reflect social value.203 If, however, a class of suits includes
200. E.g., Denicolò et al., supra note 158, at 583; Golden, supra note 141, at
2118. Findings of dramatic increases in PAE litigation relative to other suits
are not complete theoretical responses to hypotheses of underenforcement by
non-PAE patent owners, but they at least suggest that something else may be
at play. See infra Part IV.
201. See generally Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error
Under Negligence, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 433, 446–51 (1990) (examining the
effect of error rate “on incentives to litigate”).
202. E.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of
Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1088
(1989); Hylton, supra note 201, at 446; William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 252 (1979);
Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the
Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 575 (1997);
Steven Shavell, The Level of Litigation: Private Versus Social Optimality of
Suit and Settlement, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 99, 99 (1999).
203. E.g., Hylton, supra note 201, at 446–47; Avery Katz, Judicial
Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure, 8 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127, 139
(1988); Landes & Posner, supra note 202, at 273; George L. Priest & Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 55, 13–14
(1984). Of course, with any level of error, there will remain a divergence
between social value and private investment in litigation activity. See The
Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the
Legal System, supra note 202.
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many that are particularly likely to be baseless and also are
more likely than typical suits to be decided incorrectly, they
will generate direct social welfare costs and create incentives
for social-welfare-reducing settlements or other socially
wasteful litigation-avoidance measures.204 Costs also would be
higher, given any error rate for the relevant category of judicial
decisions, if a particular class of litigants has asymmetric
information (for example, on the actual novelty of a claim) and
behaves strategically (such as in the NTP-RIM case).205
On most margins, litigation by PAEs should resemble
litigation by other patentees, facing the same legal rules and
procedures for assessing patent validity, infringement, and
value. Thus, there is no reason to expect that errors for judicial
disposition of cases brought by PAEs are higher than for other
patent cases or that PAEs generally behave in ways
distinguishable from other patent litigants in their decisions
respecting the litigation. For example, PAEs should be just as
motivated to scale their litigation expenditures to the likelihood
of success as other litigants. Further, there is no obvious reason
to expect that PAEs have stronger informational asymmetries
than other patent holders; they are not obviously in a better
position vis-à-vis defendants in patent litigation to assess the
merits of patent claims (and certainly are not specially
advantaged in this respect as compared to other patent
holders).206 If PAEs are merely more efficient enforcers of
legitimate patent rights, PAEs should not impose special social
costs through litigation.
204. E.g., Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of
Litigation, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 24–25 (1990).
205. E.g., Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Third-Party Financed
Litigation 22 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11–57, 2011).
Recognizing the existence of asymmetric information in such settings is not
enough to prevent the ensuing social costs, as the party with less information
can estimate the direction in which to adjust from any offer or claim by the
party with more information, but cannot know the right magnitude of
adjustment in any given case. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for
“Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488,
489 (1970).
206. See generally Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 153, at 451 (“But there is
also empirical evidence that the patents asserted by NPEs are similar to
patents asserted by practicing entities. There is some evidence that the most
litigious NPEs lose more often when the cases are taken to a final
judgment . . . .”).
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There is, however, one margin that could remain different
for PAEs and others. For the same reason that PAEs will not
be as willing as other patent holders to resolve suits through
mechanisms such as cross-licensing or to make other
accommodations, it is plausible that PAEs as a class would
behave strategically in litigation in ways that other patent
holders would not, or at least would behave strategically more
often than other patent plaintiffs.207 PAEs may, for example,
assert weaker claims in hopes of extracting a settlement, where
other patent holders would be more sensitive to the imposition
on parties with whom they might hope to have future
cooperative dealings and more concerned with the damage to
relationships that would occur if opposing parties came to
believe that the patent assertion was less than straight-
forward.208 Given any level of error in the system, this would
correlate with higher social costs from PAE suits than from
other patent suits.209
This is logical given the information available on the
potential for hold-up in some circumstances, but it does not
provide a basis for bold changes to the law, such as restricting
PAE suits. The evidence respecting costs of NPE suits (a
category that encompasses PAE suits), as already noted, in
itself does not show that such suits are socially undesirable as
a class.210 The factors that would make PAE suits especially
likely to be undesirable—if the patents asserted tend to be
weak and if errors in adjudication are high—are matters that
increasingly are subjects of commentary, but not subjects that
have elicited the sort of information that all sides to the debate
207. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Assistant Professor, Santa Clara Univ.
Sch. of Law, Presentation at the FTC/DOJ Hearing on PAEs: Patent Assertion
Entities (Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2187314.
208. This is consistent with the findings of increasing PAE litigation
relative to other patent claimants as well as to the relative frequency of PAE
assertion of software patents. See, e.g., Chien, supra note 207; Jeruss et al.
supra note 154, at 362–64; Robin Feldman et al., The AIA 500 Expanded: The
Effects of Patent Monetization Entities (Univ. Cal. Hastings, Working Paper
No. 45, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2247195. Although the precise figures for PAE litigation can be disputed,
as they turn on particular definitions for that category as well as on the data
source for patent litigation information, the general proposition respecting
increasing importance of PAE litigation seems clearly established.
209. E.g., Katz, supra note 204, at 25–27.
210. See Hylton, supra note 205, at 22.
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can agree on as a common factual predicate.211 In the absence
of clear data on these issues, the system probably is best left to
function as it does at present at least on most margins, by
providing remedies to all patent owners, including PAEs, but
with a higher degree of skepticism (possibly a significantly
higher degree) regarding PAE demands for injunctive relief.212
The appropriate degree of skepticism in any given instance
would increase if other factors are present suggesting that the
costs of relief in that instance would be heightened, as it would
where the type of claim asserted is associated with weaker
patent quality or higher error rates.213 Those are matters
addressed below.
IV. SOFTWARE: PATENTLY PROBLEMATIC?
Two factors highlighted in Part III, the roles of patent
quality and error rates, merit special attention in sorting
through the stresses in the patent system illustrated by the
smartphone wars. While lower patent quality and higher error
rates raise the cost of patent litigation, the critical question is
how to identify cases that are likely to embody these
characteristics. Notably, both characteristics are associated
with one particular class of patents, commonly referred to as
software patents.214
“Software” is the term generally given to instructions
embodied in code designed to make machines such as
computers (but increasingly also a range of other machines,
including smartphones) work.215 The term initially was coined
to distinguish intangible machine instructions from tangible
211. See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 153, at 427, 429, 451 (“There is
little firm empirical evidence supporting this scenario of the combination of
dubious patent assertions and low settlement demands.”).
212. This does not mean that changes on other margins might not improve
the system overall or that such changes might not have special pay-off in
respect of PAE suits, especially so far as those suits are characterized by
assertion of weaker patents and imposition of higher litigation costs due to
reluctance towards settlement or a strategic commitment to use asymmetric
litigation costs as a form of leverage. See supra text accompanying notes 187–
90.
213. See infra Part IV.
214. See infra Part IV.D.
215. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Fixing Software Patents 5 (Santa Clara Univ.
Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 01–13, 2013), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/596/.
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machines, although the instructions are embodied in tangible
forms and are critical in directing the operation of machines.216
This makes software a bit different from most results of
intellectual endeavor that fit easily in one category of
intellectual property law or another. The base question
respecting software’s relationship to intellectual property law
was whether it qualified for patent protection (as an innovation
applicable to the utilitarian functioning of useful products) or
for copyright protection (as a literary work, because it
constituted a unique expression that was fixed in a specific
medium).217
A. SOFTWARE IN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW: FIRST LOOKS
Initially, courts and administrators looking at the issue
concluded that software did not qualify for protection under
patent law but did under copyright.218 Following a long line of
decisions that rejected patents for “abstract ideas,” “scientific
principles,” or “principles of nature,”219 the Supreme Court in
the 1970s invalidated software patents that expansively
covered uses of a mathematical formula or numerical
algorithm—claims framed broadly enough (in the Court’s view)
to preempt too large a field of potential uses.220 In Gottschalk v.
Benson,221 the Court held that an algorithm for converting
binary-coded numbers into binary numbers could not be
patented, a conclusion commentators viewed as tantamount to
a holding that computer software was not patentable.222 The
Court reaffirmed the Benson holding in Parker v. Flook,223
finding that the creation of software for controlling aspects of
216. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of
Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905, 927–28 n.89 (2013).
217. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972).
218. See id.
219. E.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112–13 (1853); CASS & HYLTON,
supra note 31; ROBERT PATRICKMERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT
LAW AND POLICY: CASES ANDMATERIALS 164–85 (5th ed. 2011); Arti Kaur Rai,
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of
Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 77–80 (1999).
220. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978); Gottschalk, 409
U.S. at 71–72.
221. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71–72.
222. See Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L.
REV. 959, 1020 (1986).
223. Parker, 437 U.S. at 590.
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catalytic conversion did not yield a patentable “process” within
the meaning of the Patent Act because there was insufficient
inventiveness apart from the mathematical formula embodied
in the process.224 In the early 1980s, the Court’s decision in
Diamond v. Diehr, that reliance on a mathematical equation as
part of a novel process tied to a well-specified and sufficiently
narrow practical application would not invalidate a patent,225
showed the limits of Benson and Flook and opened the door to
software patents. That remained the state of play until the
Court returned to the field over the past decade to reassert its
concerns with expansive preemption of uses of mathematical
concepts.226
While courts were skeptical of software’s fit with patent
law until the 1980s (and have retained at least a portion of that
skepticism), the administering authorities were disposed to
find software a home within the rubric of copyright.227 From
1964 on, software programs received protection from the
Copyright Office, which conferred copyright recognition under
the “rule of doubt” (reserving the question of legality for the
courts, but inclining toward registration of arguably
copyrightable material).228 The doubt expressed in this
treatment, however, was also reflected in debates over the
proper treatment of software programs during debates over
revision of the copyright law in the early 1970s.229 In 1974,
Congress created the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to consider
what protection was appropriate for software, among other
things.230 The general revision and reenactment of copyright
law, passed and signed into law in 1976, seemed to contemplate
224. Id. at 594.
225. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 175–76 (1981); see also Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) (“While a
scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable
invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of
scientific truth may be.”).
226. E.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1294 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
227. See infra notes 228–37 and accompanying text.
228. See ROBERT A. GORMAN ET AL., COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS
184 (8th ed. 2011).
229. Id.
230. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (creating
CONTU).
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continued coverage for software under the copyright rubric,231
but Congress also plainly had reserved the possibility of
revising the law to alter that rule or to strengthen it,
depending on CONTU’s findings.232 CONTU concluded that
other forms of intellectual property protection might also be
appropriate in particular circumstances, but that the most
comfortable fit for the creative elements embedded in software
programs was protection under copyright law.233 CONTU
recommended, and Congress enacted, modest changes to the
copyright law to embrace coverage of computer software
programs.234
CONTU’s report embraced copyright protection for a broad
sweep of software programs, including those embodied in media
readable only by machines rather than directly by humans.235
That recommendation continued to be controversial, however,
and doubt about the correctness of that conclusion as a matter
of law was the basis for a preliminary ruling by the district
court in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.236
The Third Circuit’s reversal of the district court read the law as
definitively resolving the matter, opening copyright for
“literary works” to those writings that are preserved in forms
readable by machines and intended to instruct the machines’
operations, rather than being designed to have the machines
reproduce a more conventional written product for human
perception.237
231. That supposition was inferable from the text of the law and was
explicit in parts of the legislative history. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54
(1976) (cited by Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d
1240, 1247 (3d Cir. 1983)).
232. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54.; cf. GORMAN ET AL., supra note 228
(explaining that Congress amended the Copyright Act on the basis of CONTU
recommendations).
233. See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1978) [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT], available at http://digital-law-online.info/CONTU/.
234. An Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028
(codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–07).
235. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 233; Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1249;
see also infra text accompanying note 237.
236. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812,
825 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
237. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1249.
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B. FITTING SOFTWARE IN THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM
The conclusion that copyright provided a more natural
home for protection of software was eminently sensible.238
Copyright principally safeguards against copying, not against
unintended use of the same or similar concepts, creating less
interference with valuable commercial activity.239 It
intentionally has a lower bar to coverage combined with less
robust protection than patent.240
Copyright protection is especially appropriate to
innovations that are reduced to writing—software programs
inevitably are inscribed in some form—and involve substantial
overlap from one set of innovations to another, much in the way
that legal writings (though original) generally take prior works
as their jumping off points.241 The incremental innovations in
software in the main tend to be modest, with differences more
in the way elements are ordered and combined than in a truly
novel idea about accomplishing fundamental, practical tasks.242
As one scholar phrases the point, “the true novelty [of software]
typically lies in how the software code is written, not the
functional concepts of gathering, manipulating or displaying
data that the code implements.”243 Smaller contributions to the
stock of novel ideas, and especially contributions that are more
in the nature of new ways of writing instructions, call for less
impressive protections from the law.244 Copyright protects
software against copying, preventing reverse engineering that
could strip investment in software development of its value, but
does not reach further to frustrate independent development of
code that performs comparable functions.245
There is, to be sure, a difference between software code and
the sort of literary work at the heart of copyright protection.
238. E.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 233, at 11.
239. Id. at 8, 11–12.
240. E.g., CASS&HYLTON, supra note 31, at 98–108.
241. E.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 233, at 9–10.
242. E.g., CASS & HYLTON, supra note 31, at 150; Bernard Chao, Finding
the Point of Novelty in Software Patents, 28 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1217 (2013);
Goldman, supra note 215, at 2; see also Richard R. Nelson, Intellectual
Property Protection for Cumulative Systems Technology, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
2674 (1994) (explaining that new technology such as software builds on
technology already in existence).
243. Goldman, supra note 215, at 4.
244. Id. at 4–5.
245. E.g., CASS&HYLTON, supra note 31, at 150.
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Software code is written to be directly connected to the
functioning of machines, the hardware that software
controls.246 Core literary works speak instead to the human
condition, to our imaginations, our hopes and fears, our
manifold interests, our aspirations, and our curiosities.
Copyright’s periphery, however, is broad, and the law self-
consciously has declined to deny copyright coverage to works of
authorship that are less highbrow or less fanciful.247 The
particular expression contained in instruction manuals is
copyrightable, though phrases in such manuals that are
commonly used or difficult to replace without immense
circumlocution are not protected.248 Even though software code
is distinguishable in the directness of its connection to the
world of practical functions, it is not so different as to fall
outside the bounds of copyright.249
Similarly, copyright’s length at first blush appears a
strained fit with protection for software. Copyright lasts for
seventy years beyond the life of the author or for roughly a
century (the range is 95–120 years) from the date of publication
for works made for hire.250 Software, in contrast, has a very
short time frame; its value diminishes rapidly.251
Contrary to the inference that this makes copyright an
inappropriate fit with software, the rapid depreciation of
software’s value supports the use of copyright.252 While it takes
years to obtain patent protection, and longer to assure that the
protection is secure, copyright attaches immediately, a special
advantage with intellectual property products that have short
time-value.253 Further, any deleterious effects of the long tail
246. E.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Functionality Malfunction
and the Problem of Overbroad, Functional Software Patents, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1399, 1442 (2013); Goldman, supra note 215, at 3.
247. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
(3d Cir. 1983); see also supra notes 235–37 and accompanying text.
248. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53–56 (1976).
249. See id. (“Rather, the list sets out the general area of copyrightable
subject matter, but with sufficient flexibility to free the courts from rigid or
outmoded concepts of the scope of particular categories.”).
250. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
251. See Goldman, supra note 215, at 2.
252. E.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 233, at 1.
253. Cf. Goldman, supra note 215, at 2 (providing that software lifecycles
typically end before patents issue).
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on copyright (a much debated topic)254 likely will be irrelevant
to software, as there is little prospect that it will be copied well
into the future. At bottom, copyright law provides a fairly good
fit with protection of software’s intellectual contributions,
balancing the benefits of supporting investment in innovation
against the costs in interference with other valuable activity.255
Trade secret law also has a role to play in protecting
software, though the fit here, too, initially looks poor. Trade
secret law generally is best at protecting truly novel creations
that are difficult to reverse-engineer and that have long-term
value, substantially beyond the life of patent’s protections.256
The protection can be costly because it requires cabining
information from people who might efficiently use it and
because it generally is tied to employment contracts and the
threat of litigation (which is an inducement to warm and fuzzy
feelings in employment the same way that discussion of pre-
nuptial contracts contributes to romantic conversations).257 In
settings where a team works on an advance, such as in
development efforts for complex software, the hopes for long-
term secrecy are slight.258 Yet the very time limitation of
software value that looks at odds with trade secret helps here;
contractual arrangements can provide reasonably secure
protection of some aspects of the software and at a minimum
can assist in delaying diffusion of critical information to
competitors.259 This does not, however, provide security against
copying that can be done without assistance of the development
254. E.g., CASS & HYLTON, supra note 31, at 121–25; WILLIAM M. LANDES
& RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW ch. 2–3 (2003); Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to
Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 66–
78 (2002); Avishalom Tor & Dotan Oliar, Incentives to Create Under a
“Lifetime-Plus-Years” Copyright Duration: Lessons from a Behavioral
Economic Analysis for Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437, 437–44
(2002).
255. See, e.g., Tor & Oliar, supra note 254, at 437–38.
256. E.g., CASS & HYLTON, supra note 31, at 76–96; see also LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 254, at 354–71. See generally David D. Friedman et al.,
Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61 (1991).
257. See, e.g., Friedman et al., supra note 256, at 67.
258. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 233, at 15–18 (comparing copyright
protection to other methods, emphasizing the problems trade secrecy would
pose to software).
259. Id.
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team, a point that was made in the early evaluation of
copyright coverage as an additional protection.260
C. SOFTWARE AND PATENT: UNPACKING THE PROBLEMS
Protection of software under patent law has proved more
controversial than protection under other intellectual property
rights regimes.261 Courts set aside early reservations focused
on whether granting software patents essentially requires
locking up all innovation related to a mathematical formula or
numerical algorithm, or instead can leave enough scope for
invention to hold that other innovative components of software
could be patented, but concerns over software patenting have
remained.262 Key concerns include whether software patents
are inevitably overbroad, whether patents are necessary to
protect innovation in this arena, and whether the overlap with
other intellectual property rights regimes that promote
investment and shield its products from copying makes patent
protection dangerous or unwise.263
D. OVERBREADTH AND PATENTQUALITY
Several commentators have observed that patents for
software tend to be excessively broad, protecting functions that
are not exclusively generated through the operation of the
algorithm that is the special contribution of a particular
software program.264 This complaint at times is joined with the
observation that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
for many years gave relatively light scrutiny to software
patents, essentially serving as an open door to software
patenting.265 Precise definition of software patents is difficult
and estimates of the number of software patent applications
filed and patents granted varies dramatically,266 but it is clear
260. E.g., id.
261. See supra Part IV.A.
262. See supra notes 218–27 and accompanying text.
263. E.g., Chao, supra note 242, at 1235–36; Collins, supra note 246, at
1403; Lemley, supra note 216; Goldman, supra note 215.
264. E.g., Collins, supra note 246, at 1464; Goldman, supra note 215, at 4.
265. E.g., Goldman, supra note 215, at 8.
266. See, e.g., Robert Hunt & James Bessen, The Software Patent
Experiment, BUS. REV., Q3 2004, at 22, available at http://www.phil.frb.org
/research-and-data/publications/business-review/2004/q3/brq304rh.pdf
(estimating more than 20,000 software patents granted annually as of the
early 2000s, based on a keyword search of invention descriptions in the PTO
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that the number of applications and grants in this field rose
very substantially in the 1990s to mid-2000s.267
There is little reason to believe that examiners at the PTO
are inherently less knowledgeable about software than other
technologies, less capable of inquiring into the novelty of
software patent claims, or less able to examine the
patentability of claimed elements as subjects within the scope
of patent law. Software patent overbreadth may not be a
permanent problem if, as seems plausible, the relatively easy
grants of broad patents during the 1990s (and perhaps early
2000s) reflected examiners’ uncertainty over the directions the
courts were giving respecting software patents, or if the
problem during the years in question flowed from a relative
paucity of sound information on prior art in a fairly new and
rapidly evolving field.268
Some commentators have argued to the contrary, that the
nature of software makes it inherently prone to overbroad
patents. Professor Kevin Collins, for example, points out that
software patents rely on mathematical formulae designed to
govern specific functionality but are not tied to a particular
machine or to the transformation of a given material, making
these patents, in his view, purely functional.269 However, this
may not point to a problem inherent in software patenting as a
category.
While not expressly adopting a test that would limit
patents to those that passed the machine-or-transformation
test, the Supreme Court recently emphasized the importance of
assuring that the elements of a patent claim that connect to the
specific machine or transformation of a given material have
sufficient novelty to support a patent grant.270 In its 2014
patent database); Jim Singer, Software Patent Statistics, IP SPOTLIGHT BLOG
(Dec. 24, 2009), http://ipspotlight.com/2009/12/24/software-patent-statistics/
(providing that there was a high of 752 software patent grants by the PTO in
2006, declining to just over 700 the following two years); see also Chao, supra
note 242, at 1225 & n.54, 1229–30 (comparing different definitions of software,
resulting in different estimates of the number of patents).
267. See supra note 266.
268. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 215, at 4 (suggesting the paucity of
prior art as a possible cause of sparing examination and lenient grants of
software patents).
269. E.g., Collins, supra note 246, at 1449.
270. E.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1300 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
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decision in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., the
Supreme Court again stressed the need for software patents,
like all patents, to be based on something beyond an abstract
idea.271 The Court said that claim references to implementation
of such an idea through computer functions must be specific
enough and inventive enough to state a patentable invention—
a step that was missing in Alice Corp.’s references to generic
computerized implementation of the idea of intermediated
settlement—but the Court did not find that software was
inherently unpatentable or required special rules.272
The Supreme Court’s continued emphasis on novelty and
specification of the inventive elements suggests the availability
of tools sufficient to permit the PTO to constrain software
patents, just as it should constrain business method patents,
biomedical patents, or any other patents.273 The PTO’s Director
has recognized the agency’s past struggles to meter the scope,
novelty, and nonobviousness of software patents appropriately
and has instituted new initiatives to address these issues.274
The conclusion that software patents need not be
overbroad—that PTO examiners have the leeway, and in fact
have the obligation, under the existing legal rules to limit
software patents as well as other patents—is not a denial of
assertions that software patents frequently are overbroad,
overstating the scope of the novel contribution made by the
claimed innovation.275 Apart from the absolute level of
problems with this category of patents, there is plenty of
thoughtful commentary contending that this category of
patents is relatively problematic compared to other patent
categories—that these patents more often overstate the novelty
of the innovation, more often include claims that extend too
271. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2347 (2014).
272. Id. at 2357.
273. Cf. Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the
Middle Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1655–56 (2007) (urging, more generally,
the availability of legal doctrines respecting patent grants as sufficient to limit
software patents).
274. See David Kappos, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Keynote
Address at the Center for American Progress: An Examination of Software
Patents (Nov. 20, 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news
/speeches/2012/kappos_CAP.jsp.; Software Partnership, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/software
_partnership.jsp (last updated Aug. 7, 2014).
275. E.g., Kappos, supra note 274.
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broadly, more often leave potential users of similar technology
unclear about the scope of the legitimate legal protection, and
more often are the subject of unsuccessful litigation than other
categories of patents.276
Despite contrary arguments about the quality of these
patents as a whole,277 at a minimum the evidence supports the
conclusion that many software patents present excessively
broad or insufficiently well-defined claims.278 These are not the
same objections: lack of definition (what has been referred to by
Professors Bessen and Meurer as the “patent notice”
problem)279 is a separate matter from patent quality—grants
that exceed the scope of what is novel and nonobvious.280 The
quality problem is that award of patents more frequently in
this field to inventions that do not meet statutory requirements
incurs the social costs of patent protection without providing
the offsetting social benefits of promoting novel invention.281 Of
course, some errors (including some undeserved patent grants)
are inevitable, but a large and asymmetric error rate threatens
to up-end the social benefit that supports patents.282 There is
no persuasive reason to expect that software patents will be
systematically less clear than other patents;283 but, as the
276. E.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 11, at 201–03; Chao, supra note
242, at 1235–36; Collins, supra note 246, at 1140; Lemley, supra note 216, at
905; Goldman, supra note 215, at 8. But see Allison & Mann, supra note 22.
277. E.g., Allison & Mann, supra note 22, at 318.
278. Id.
279. But see BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 11, at ch. 7 (arguing that
software patents are more uncertain as a class due to the nature of the subject
matter being patented). This is not a logical inevitability, as abstractness does
not necessarily produce a lack of clarity and descriptions of specific tangible
items are not unerringly clear; but that observation does not deny that early
software patents frequently may have been less well-crafted and less clear
than typical utility patents.
280. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 215, at 4.
281. Id.
282. E.g., CASS&HYLTON, supra note 31.
283. Moreover, the concerns about uncertainty in software patents stressed
by Bessen and Meurer even if more robustly substantiated, are not obvious as
reasons for problems in patent litigation. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note
11, at ch. 7. Uncertainty (along with the differential predictions about
outcomes predicated on the information about which there is uncertainty)
plays a complex role in decisions respecting suit and settlement generally. See,
e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect
Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404, 405 (1984); Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric
Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD.
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following discussion indicates, the quality problem may be a
special one with respect to software patents given other
protections for software. In other words, even if the problem of
patent quality in software patent grants turns out to be a
transitory rather than an endemic condition (a matter that, as
with the patent notice question, is open to contradictory
predictions),284 there is still a basis for special concern over low-
quality patents in this field.285
E. NECESSITY FOR PATENT PROTECTION.
Another argument against software patents contends that
patent protection is unnecessary because software development
confers substantial first-mover advantages286 or because
innovation is sufficiently promoted by protections for software
programs under copyright and trade secret law.287 Neither
prong of this argument provides a basis for denying protection
to software categorically. Nothing in the patent law or other
intellectual property laws predicates eligibility for legal
protection on the absence of other commercial advantage to
innovation.288 Sectors such as software can generate significant
network effects that tip consumers toward an initially
successful technology and expand the benefits of innovation.289
But the same can be said of other sectors and other types of
innovation—the classic example of these effects has been the
QWERTY keyboard, which represents a practical-design choice
for hardware.290
187, 196 (1993). There is no reason to expect different impact from uncertainty
in patent litigation.
284. See, e.g., Kappos, supra note 274 (contending that some of the most
troubling software patents on these scores have now expired and that
mechanisms are in place to limit prospects for such grants going forward).
285. Id.
286. E.g., Chao, supra note 242, at 1224 n.46; Goldman, supra note 215, at
2.
287. E.g., Chao, supra note 242, at 1224 n.46; Goldman, supra note 215, at
3.
288. See infra notes 291–92 and accompanying text.
289. E.g., Katz & Shapiro, supra note 88, at 30; Lopatka & Page, supra
note 88, at 343.
290. E.g., W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns,
and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 126 (1989); Paul A. David,
Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 332–37 (1985);
S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON.
1 (1990).
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Rejection of categorical exclusion of software from patent
eligibility also accords with the text of current law, which does
not exclude any set of patent applications that are able to meet
the statutory tests for patent.291 It also accords with the
treatment given by the Supreme Court in other cases where
patent protection overlaps with another category of intellectual
property protection, such as that provided under the plant
protection acts.292
F. OVERLAP ANDOVERPROTECTION
However, when different legal regimes provide overlapping
protections for a single innovation, there is a significant risk
that cumulative protections will provide excessively broad
rights to the innovator at the expense of those who would use
or benefit from expanded exploitation of the innovation.293 This
risk has been a concern at the boundaries between copyright
and patent and between copyright and trademark for creative
products such as ornamental designs and literary characters.294
While the exact scope and length of protection that is socially
ideal is unknowable, adding the protections of one intellectual
property system to those of another can up-end the generally
sensible balance that is struck by each property rights
regime.295
The risk of overprotection can be reduced where different
intellectual property regimes protect different uses of a creative
work (for example, derivative literary works using expressive
features of a character from a copyrighted work and toys based
on the trademarked character).296 In the case of software,
however, both copyright and patent protect the same uses of
the innovation, adding restrictions on the use of processes and
methods of operation claimed in the patent to copyright’s
restrictions on reproducing the program’s code.297
291. See, e.g., BESSEN&MEURER, supra note 11, at 204.
292. E.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S.
124, 145–46 (2001); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
293. E.g., CASS&HYLTON, supra note 31, at 148–51.
294. E.g., id.
295. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 242, at 2674.
296. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 233, at 16–18 (describing various IP
regimes and their distinct protection purposes).
297. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 242, at 2675–76.
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Concerns about overprotection are compounded where
patents are awarded on claims that are not carefully limited to
reflect the patent law’s core requirements of novelty,
nonobviousness, and utility.298 Whatever one makes of
arguments respecting overbreadth in software patents as a
strict matter of fit with patent rules, there is extra reason for
the PTO to scrutinize software patent claims given the overlap
with copyright. This may already be occurring, and more than
a few software patents have been denied on reexamination, but
the need for scrutiny of software patents should be taken
seriously at the initial patent issue stage.299
Heightened scrutiny for these patents is especially
important given the way that low-quality patents can be used
strategically in litigation300. Standard remedies for patent
infringement create hold-up opportunities for litigation filed
after the fact (after a product is being produced) against the
producing enterprises—especially where the product is highly
complex, and most of all where substantial losses would attend
removing the product from the market to reconfigure it to be
non-infringing.301 As explained above, although the case
against providing statutorily available remedies to PAEs has
not been made, PAEs are most likely to exploit the
opportunities for strategic gain.302
Prospects for such use of patents to extract value that is
not associated with the use of the patented product or
process—as in the NTP-RIM litigation—puts a premium on
judicial abilities to sort through patent claims promptly and
accurately, assuring that remedies are available only where
valid patents are infringed. Those abilities, unfortunately, are
apt to be tested in cases involving software patent claims,
where difficult questions respecting the work done by
298. See supra notes 274–81 and accompanying text.
299. The calculus of the most efficient means for testing questionable
patents (captured in the balance between “police patrols” and “fire alarms”
seen in other contexts) needs adjustment to reflect the effects that attach to
patent awards, even if otherwise post-award screening of validity would have
lower cost. On the more general question of ex ante versus ex post screening,
see, for example, Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI.
165 (1984).
300. See, e.g., BESSEN&MEURER, supra note 11, at 18–19.
301. See, e.g., id.
302. See supra Part III.
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mathematical formulae, the degree of limitation to particular
machines or specified physical operations, and the amount of
novelty or nonobviousness are often presented.303 The
intersection of questionable patents, overbroad claims,
strategic use of litigation against producers of complex
commercial products, and chances for judicial error in dealing
with the technologies at issue raises special risks of
overprotection.304
Recognition of these risks should caution judges and
administrators reviewing patents asserted (or likely to be
asserted) in such settings, software patents in particular, to be
especially certain that the patents fully and clearly meet the
legal tests. Reducing the incidence of legal error on this score
will not resolve all of the problems associated with the
litigation of patents that cover uses of creative-inventive work
also protected by copyright in settings like those seen in the
smartphone patent fights, but it at least will lower the risks
and costs of overprotection and help re-balance the costs and
benefits of intellectual property protections in this arena.
V. CONCLUSION
The smartphone wars are not over, but they have gone on
long enough to yield a few lessons. First, most of the broad,
categorical “fixes” to problems associated with the smartphone
patent wars—problems associated with hold-up risks to uses of
patented technologies by makers of highly complex products—
sweep too broadly, throwing out good claims as well as bad and
needed remedies as well as questionable ones. Second, despite
the problematic nature of most categorical solutions (such as
barring injunctive relief to NPEs), there are some factors likely
to be associated with high costs and significant risks of
discouraging beneficial innovative activity. Two factors in
particular deserve special note.
303. See supra Part IV.
304. That is a primary basis for calls to eliminate software patents, as well
as for restrictions on PAE remedies. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 18. There is
some evidence that courts are denying software patent claims asserted in
litigation at a higher rate than other patent claims, but that this has not
prevented significantly higher rates of litigation for these patents. See, e.g.,
John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent
Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 709 (2011).
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The first of these is the role of PAEs in patent litigation.
PAEs can serve valuable, socially beneficial functions, but they
have greater prospect than other patent plaintiffs, including
other NPEs, to use patent litigation strategically to extract
monetary rewards significantly in excess of patent value.
Differences in litigation costs (especially discovery costs) and in
pragmatic constraints on use of litigation to extract excessively
large returns make PAE suits more problematic given any level
of error in deciding the underlying patent issues. In a world of
positive error rates, the combination of litigation costs and risk
can provide effective levers for hold-up, and PAE suits are
especially apt to use the levers to that end.
The other factor of special concern is patent quality, which
has been a special concern with respect to software patents.
Problems with software patent quality, and the peculiar
problem of double-protection for software under both patent
and copyright, can exacerbate problems in the underlying
patent litigation system, especially those evidenced in the
mobile device area. This does not mean that there is no room
for patents on truly novel, innovative software innovations,
appropriately limited. But, as with other patents, awards of
overbroad, non-novel, or obvious software patents generate
costs, which have been particularly evident in the smartphone
wars. The risk of a misapplication of the law in such
instances—resulting in billion-dollar damage verdicts as in the
Apple-Samsung case or in the prospect of excluding a firm’s key
products from the market or in effectively shutting down
critical company operations, a result that had become
imminent in the NTP-RIM litigation—is an inducement for
firms that have sound positions on patent law to compromise,
for firms that have questionable positions to press ahead, and
for everyone to incur costs that clearer rules and more
predictable application would reduce.
The answer to problems encountered in the smartphone
wars does not need to reach as far as barring PAE suits,
eliminating software patents, or making traditionally available
remedies categorically off-limits for PAEs or for complaints of
infringement of software patents. Instead, what is needed at a
minimum—and can be implemented immediately without
additional legislation—is heightened sensitivity to the risks
associated with lax application of novelty and nonobviousness
requirements in the context of software patents and sensitivity
to the risks injunctive relief poses to PAEs asserting weak
patents on minor innovations used in complex products. In the
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same vein, the PTO can invest in improved education for
patent examiners respecting issues presented in software
patenting, enhanced databases for prior art, and increased
review of software patenting to monitor quality issues—all
matters within the agency’s purview if not necessarily within
its budget. Finally, and most difficult to design appropriately,
legislative attention to the issue might reduce costs from PAE
litigation of low-quality software patents in contexts, such as
the smartphone litigation, where strategic behavior is most
expected and most difficult to control.
Ultimately, focus on the smartphone wars should be less
concerned with concluding that something has gone wrong than
on what to do about it. Learning the right lessons from wars
makes the inevitable next one less frightening. Learning the
wrong lessons makes for expensive investment in the Maginot
Line.
